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CHAPTER 1 THE POLITICS OF FOOD SECURITY 
Introduction 
This dissertation examines the empirical relationship between democracy, 
decentralization, federalism, and food security across countries and over time. This dissertation 
employs the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) (M. D. Jones et al. 2016; Kingdon 1984; Zahariadis 
2007)  from the field of public policy as a basis to hypothesize about how democracy, 
decentralization, and federalism affect the specific policy outcome of food security, and then 
tests these hypotheses using a newly compiled dataset of all countries from 1990 to 2011. What 
makes governments pay attention to food insecurity? To what extent does democracy affect food 
security? Do formal federations have more food security than unitary systems? To what extent 
does decentralization affect food security? Do different types of decentralization (fiscal, 
administrative, or political) affect food security? The answers to these questions will contribute 
to the literature on democracy, decentralization, federalism, and social welfare.  
The relationship between democracy and social welfare is the subject of an active debate 
that measures and operationalizes these concepts in several different ways. Scholars have sought 
to measure and test democracy’s effect on social spending (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; 
Brown and Hunter 1999, 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Stasavage 2005), and on 
social welfare outcomes (Lake and Baum 2001) including poverty rates (Pribble, Huber, and 
Stephens 2009), school fees and attendance (Harding and Stasavage 2014), and infant mortality 
(Ross 2006). Most of this literature has a regional focus; some scholars study exclusively Latin 
America (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999, 2004; Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo 2001; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009) or Africa (Harding and Stasavage 2014; 
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Stasavage 2005). The most consistent finding from these regional studies is that democracies 
spend more on social programs than authoritarian systems. Studies with a global scope are less 
common (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Lake and Baum 2001; Ross 2006). Only one study has 
examined democracy’s effect on a direct indicator of food security: per capita calorie availability 
(Blaydes and Kayser 2011). Whether the increased social spending in democracies translates to 
better social outcomes among those who need it most is, therefore, not a settled question. 
Food security is a basic human need; it exists when all people have enough nutritious food 
for an active and healthy life. Despite being fundamental to all human life, and therefore to any 
definition of social welfare, food security remains understudied in the political science literature 
on politics and social welfare. This project uses food security as a measure of social welfare, and 
studies it quantitatively on a newly assembled dataset of secondary data with a global scope.  
To date, no studies have specifically addressed federalism’s or, more generally, 
decentralization’s effect on food security. Not only does this dissertation address this gap in the 
literature, but also it contributes to a methodologically diverse literature that examines 
federalism and social policy (Pierson 1995; Rodden 2010). It builds on prior work that has 
operationalized and constructed measurements of three dimensions of decentralization –  fiscal, 
administrative, and political (Schneider 2003a) –  by employing these measures as independent 
variables. The dataset also incorporates recent data from the International Monetary Fund 
Government Finance Statistics Database to directly measure the dimensions of decentralization, 
providing several different ways to test the relationship between food security and 
decentralization.  
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Scholars have examined the relationship between decentralization and pro-poor policy 
outcomes broadly defined (Jütting et al. 2005; Schneider 2003b; Von Braun and Grote 2000), 
poverty reduction (Ali Khan 2013; Crawford 2008; Crook 2003; Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Vedeld 
2003), education outcomes (Faguet and Sánchez 2008), health outcomes (Uchimara and Jütting 
2009), and responsiveness to local needs (Faguet 2004). While this literature uses a common 
theoretical frame – that decentralization is expected to be more efficient and more effective than 
centralization (Jütting et al. 2005) – single or small-N comparative case studies are most often 
employed. This dissertation will examine decentralization using a large-N comparative dataset, 
and it will apply existing theory on decentralization to a new policy problem: food security.  
How and whether political institutions and arrangements affect social welfare is a 
perennial question in political science. As more and more countries transition to democracy, the 
relationship between democracy and social welfare has been a focus of attention. 
Decentralization too has been an active topic in recent years, especially as it has evolved in 
developing countries. While the case for decentralization may be strong theoretically, there is 
some question about how well it works in practice. Finally, food security itself is a fundamental 
human need and it underpins health, productivity and welfare. This dissertation bridges several 
literatures and brings the focus squarely onto the question of whether these political 
determinants – democracy, federalism, and decentralization – affect food security. 
The Multiple Streams Approach 
This project uses the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) (M. D. Jones et al. 2016; Kingdon 
1984; Zahariadis 2007) from the field of public policy as a way to organize arguments and talk 
about politics and policy problems. First proposed by Kingdon (1984), the MSA has been widely 
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used and applied in many settings across the world (M. D. Jones et al. 2016). The MSA models 
policymaking at the system level, and conceives of political systems as composed of three 
streams: problems, policies, and politics. The problem, policy, and politics streams flow through 
the political system independently of one another. At critical moments, policy windows open and 
provide the opportunity for changes in policy. When a policy window opens, a policy 
entrepreneur (essentially, a power broker) can couple the three streams together – a specific 
policy, addressing a particular problem, at a fortuitous moment in politics – and policy change 
can occur – a new policy is placed on the decisional agenda, or a new policy is adopted. The MSA 
is a useful tool to talk about how politics affects problem definition and policy choice at the 
system level. 
 Problems are social conditions that exist in a society, but not all social conditions are 
problems. They become problems when some person or interest group that cares about them 
becomes powerful enough to define them as something that ought to be addressed by 
government action. The problem stream is commonly operationalized by indicators, which are 
statistics or other measurements that describe the seriousness, scope, or magnitude of a given 
problem. These indicators form a steady flow of information, and sometimes changes or trends 
in certain indicators, or simply the introduction of new indicators measuring an existing problem, 
can precipitate policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Policies are solutions. They may 
arise in the policy stream in response to specific problems, but they are not always generated 
secondary to problems. Policies often exist independently of problems that they could address, 
and their champions will actively seek new problem areas that can justify the adoption of their 
preferred policies (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Policies sink or swim based on several criteria, 
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including value acceptability (whether the policy conforms to prevailing values within the political 
system), technical feasibility, and adequacy of resources (M. D. Jones et al. 2016, 16). Politics 
comprises the ideological composition of a given government, the national mood, and the 
relative power of interests and the pressure they can bring to bear. The politics stream provides 
the theoretical framework for the empirical tests presented in this project. Bringing new players 
into the system, as democracy does by empowering previously disempowered groups, changes 
the power balance and therefore opens the possibility of defining social conditions like food 
security as political problems, and adopting new policies to address those problems.  
Democracy and Food Security 
Democracy is, at its most essential, a political system in which power is transferred 
through regular elections. Democracy also encompasses concepts such as political rights, civil 
liberties, and the rule of law. This project takes a broad view of democracy that includes these 
features of a democratic polity. Democracies and non-democracies differ from one another in 
politics, problems, and policies. In each difference, democracies are more likely than non-
democracies to pay attention to food security, to treat it as a political problem, and to take action 
to address food insecurity (Dreze and Sen 1991; Sen 1982, 1983, 1996).  
Politics in democracies and non-democracies differ along the dimensions of 
representation, accountability, responsiveness, participation, and mobilization. Democracies 
differ from non-democracies in their degree of representation. Public officials in democracies are 
accountable to their constituents through regular elections. Because politicians are accountable 
to their constituents, they should be more responsive to the needs of their constituents in 
democracies than in non-democracies. Broader segments of society participate in political 
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decisions in democracies versus non-democracies. People participate in political decisions in 
democracies through either voting or through mobilization that puts pressure on public officials. 
Why does this matter for food security? In non-democracies, politicians need only respect the 
preferences of the societal coalition that keeps them in power, and that coalition may be 
exceedingly small and is often solely comprised of elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002). Food 
insecurity is largely a problem of those living on the lower economic rungs of any societal ladder. 
In non-democratic countries, it is precisely these people who usually lack a political voice.  
In developing countries, large proportions of the population are food insecure (FAO, IFAD, 
and WFP 2015). Under democracy, numbers translate to political power. Food insecure people 
are afforded the means to make the government address food security, and are able to punish 
those public officials who ignore the issue. Since, in developing countries, the number of people 
suffering from food insecurity is substantial, food insecurity is precisely the type of problem that 
would enter the decisional agenda in a democracy and be ignored in a non-democracy. 
The differences between democracies and non-democracies in the politics stream in turn 
affect the problems stream. Because there is representation of broader segments of society in 
democracies than in non-democracies, more conditions in society can come to be viewed as 
political problems that ought to be addressed by public action. Food insecurity is just such a 
condition. Historically, food insecurity was considered to be an unavoidable fact that 
accompanied population growth (Malthus 1872) – as populations grew, food production would 
not be able to keep up, inevitably leaving many unable to meet their basic nutritional needs. This 
is the core of the argument that food availability is the causal factor in food insecurity. In the 20th 
century, thinkers (de Castro 1952, 1972; Dreze and Sen 1991; Sen 1983) began to redefine food 
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insecurity, showing that it is a product of the political choices that structure food distribution, 
more related to the question of who has power and resources within a society than to the 
amount of available food. This is core of the argument that food accessibility is the most 
important causal consideration in food security. Of course, writings among scholars and thinkers 
can provide a conceptual framework, and can cause people in society to view problems 
differently, but they do not necessarily make it onto the political agenda. That step usually occurs 
due to political pressure, which is more often possible in democracies than in non-democracies.  
Democracies have more space for group formation in civil society than non-democracies, 
often ensured through protections surrounding freedom of association. Pressure groups can 
mobilize around issues that would be considered background conditions in the absence of such 
mobilization. Given teeth through the mechanisms of accountability through representation, 
such mobilization can define food insecurity as a political problem, bring it onto the public 
agenda, and incentivize politicians to take political action to solve it. In non-democracies, food 
insecurity can be ignored or remain defined as a condition rather than a problem unless the 
underlying regime ideology tends to turn attention towards it, or unless some elite group 
becomes a champion for the issue, thus causing politicians to pay attention (Varshney 2000). 
While these mechanisms may intermittently cause non-democracies to provide food security, 
the mechanisms in democracy make it more likely that politicians as a matter of basic political 
survival will address food security as a political problem.  
The policy stream on the issue of food insecurity is strongly influenced by the problem 
definition adopted within a given country. For example, food insecurity has profound effects in 
the first 1000 days of life, with early nutritional deficits manifesting themselves over an 
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individual’s lifetime (The Lancet 2013). Many countries have defined the problem of food 
insecurity in this manner, and have chosen to focus their efforts on maternal and child food 
insecurity as a result (SUN 2015). Other countries have defined food insecurity as a problem that 
results from lack of economic access to sufficient food because of poverty, pointing to economic 
growth-centered solutions (Varshney 2000).  
As I explore more fully in Chapter 2, food insecurity is a complex issue with many 
manifestations and myriad causes. It is particularly prone to redefinition, which can point to 
widely varying policy solutions. This may be more of an issue under democracy than non-
democracy. In democracies, a competing array of interests struggle to capture politicians’ 
attention. Since food insecurity is multi-causal, it may be an issue that many groups can latch 
onto in order to push particularistic agendas. Most food insecurity policies have long time 
horizons for the positive effects to be felt – that is, they require a certain amount of political 
commitment over the long term. Politicians in democracies have famously short time horizons – 
usually reaching to the next election – and so long-term policies that could be more effective may 
be forsworn in favor of short-term projects that can be directly attributed to current politicians 
(Harding and Stasavage 2014).  
Hypotheses: Democracy and Food Security. The foregoing discussion illustrates that it is not 
simply elections that make democracy qualitatively different – freedom of expression and 
assembly, mobilization, participation, and representation all must play a role if democracy is to 
change social welfare. This dissertation employs a concept of democracy that is readily measured 
quantitatively using the Freedom House indexes of Civil Liberties and Political Rights, while 
retaining as much as possible the meaningful depth that inheres in the concept.  
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Democracy exists along two dimensions. Political rights comprise the first dimension. Are 
there elections? Are they free and fair? Do parties compete freely? Is suffrage universal and 
participation of all social groups allowed? Civil liberties comprise the second dimension. Are basic 
rights protected? Is there freedom of expression, association, and assembly? Is the rule of law 
respected? These two aspects of democracy both provide different avenues for democracy to 
affect food security. Political rights provide the means to hold politicians accountable; open 
participation assures that disadvantaged groups can freely choose those that represent their 
interests (and punish those who do not). However, without the full complement of civil liberties, 
those groups may not be able to articulate their interests in the first place, mobilize fully to 
achieve their goals, or keep up political pressure between elections to ensure that 
representatives remain attentive. Responsiveness – a major factor in the argument that 
democracy will produce higher food security – is promoted by both increased political rights and 
increased civil liberties. Therefore, I propose a pair of hypotheses to test the relationship 
between democracy and food security: 
 H1: Countries with more political rights will have more food security. 
 H2: Countries with more civil liberties will have more food security. 
By dividing the hypotheses along the two dimensions, I will be able to test the relative importance 
of both civil liberties and political rights, rather than conflating the two (or dropping a dimension) 
in a simplified concept of democracy. 
Federalism and Decentralization: What is the Difference? 
Governmental Structure. Governments project power over a given geographical space, and in so 
doing, they must incorporate a (more or less) diverse population with a variety of needs and 
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preferences. To this end, there are three main types of governmental structure: federal, unitary, 
and confederal. Federal systems of government comprise at least two levels of government – 
national and subnational – that have constitutionally defined authority to govern their respective 
territories (Burgess 2006; King 1982). Federal constitutions provide for the “distribution of 
legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue sources…ensuring some areas of 
genuine autonomy” (Watts 2016, 12). Federations have formal procedures to incorporate the 
constituent subnational governments into decision-making at the national level, and the 
constituent governments retain autonomy, to varying degrees, within their own jurisdictions 
(Burgess 2006). The constitutional basis of federations is an important defining characteristic, 
because it draws a bright line between federations and unitary systems – those in which only the 
central government has the ultimate authority to govern. Both federations and unitary systems 
may function in a decentralized manner (discussed below), but in federations, changes to the 
structure of authority require subnational agreement and supermajority action, whereas in 
unitary systems changes can be made through normal majoritarian processes and are entirely at 
the discretion of the central government. Finally, confederal systems are like federal ones in that 
they have at least two levels of empowered government, but the authority in confederations 
ultimately resides in the subnational governments, which delegate powers to the national 
government for specific purposes. 
 There are currently twenty-seven federal countries in the world.1 They are diverse aside 
from their federal structure and the particular politics that entails. Some are continental in scope, 
                                                          
1 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, 
India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Venezuela. 
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like Australia, while others are tiny island nations, like Comoros. Some have many subnational 
governments, like Russia, while others have only a few, like Belgium. Some are based in civil law 
systems, like Austria, while others are based in common law systems, like the United States. 
Some of them formed from unions of independent states, like Switzerland; others through 
devolution from unitary regimes, like Nigeria; and still others from a combination of the two, like 
Canada.  All of them began in an effort to accommodate regional diversity, but that diversity may 
have been historical or territorial, like it was in Mexico, or cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or 
a combination of these, like in India.  
All federal countries have subnational governments, but those governments differ 
substantially in the scope of their jurisdiction – that is, in what policies they may enact and what 
powers they hold (Watts 2016, 15–17). The legislative power may reside at the national level 
while the administrative powers are decentralized, as it is in Austria, or the subnational 
governments may have both legislative and executive powers, as in the United States. If 
legislative powers exist at the subnational level, policymaking authority may be exclusive to 
different levels, concurrent between levels, shared among levels, or residual (that is, one level 
may have all policymaking authority not explicitly assigned elsewhere). A few federations – Brazil, 
India (as of 1992), South Africa, and Venezuela – have constitutionally defined jurisdictions for 
local level governments as well (Watts 2016, 16).  
 Federal systems, however, have commonalities, and they stem from the constitutional 
nature of the political structure. While the scope of jurisdiction of the constituent governments 
varies widely, subnational governments have substantial autonomy within their jurisdictions 
(Watts 2016, 17). This autonomy is protected in federations in a way that it is not in unitary 
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systems. It cannot be altered easily – often requiring a constitutional amendment. This 
entrenchment of the structure of power within federal systems stimulates, enables, and 
empowers certain political groups within those systems to enshrine their preferences in 
government policy. Often, redistribution is constrained in federal systems, both institutionally, 
and by the particular politics that federalism engenders (discussed below). 
 Federalism, when viewed from the standpoint of structure, represents an 
institutionalized form of decentralization. However, as with formal and informal institutions, 
decentralization may exist de jure or de facto: a system that is greatly decentralized in its 
structure – like a federal system – may be quite centralized in its function, and likewise a 
structurally centralized government – like a unitary system – may be decentralized in function. In 
order to discuss this phenomenon more meaningfully, I first turn to a discussion of 
decentralization in political systems in general, and then relate decentralization to federalism 
more specifically. 
Decentralization. Whether a country is federal or unitary in a formal sense, political power in 
practice exists along a spectrum of decentralization. Decentralization is the extent to which the 
functions of power are distributed away from the national government to different levels of 
government. If all power is held at the national level, a country is said to be centralized; a country 
with all power held at the subnational levels would be decentralized. 
Decentralization has three commonly cited dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and 
political (Schneider 2003a; Von Braun and Grote 2000). These dimensions address three 
questions about how power is distributed. Firstly, what level of government controls the 
monetary resources within the system? How is fiscal impact distributed between levels? The 
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answers to these questions place a country on a spectrum of fiscal decentralization. For example, 
if funding flows at the national level’s discretion from the national to the subnational levels and 
those levels lack the power to raise their own funds, the country would be fiscally centralized. If 
the subnational levels are fiscally independent of the national level – for example, if they collect 
their own taxes, or if the transfers from the central government are constitutionally mandated 
and/or unconditional – the country would be fiscally decentralized. If the national government 
does the bulk of expenditures, then the country would be fiscally centralized. If the subnational 
governments are making more expenditures relative to the national government, that would be 
more fiscally decentralized. 
Secondly, what level of government decides what policies to pursue? Who implements 
these policies? The answers to these questions place a country on a spectrum of administrative 
decentralization. For example, if subnational levels of government can adopt and implement 
policy independent of national government influence or control, the country would be 
administratively decentralized. If bureaucrats at the subnational levels are employed by the 
national government and implementing national level policies, then the country would be 
administratively centralized. The more autonomy the subnational governments have from 
national control, the more administratively decentralized a country would be. 
Thirdly, at what level of government does representation occur? Where does political 
authority lie? The answers to these questions place a country on a spectrum of political 
decentralization. As a structural matter, if a country had elections at the national, state or 
provincial, and municipal levels, it would be politically decentralized; a politically centralized 
country would only have elections at the national level. However, political decentralization is a 
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functional matter as well. If subnational elected representatives are largely ceremonial, having 
little power within their jurisdictions, or if subnational elected officials are simply stand-ins for 
national authorities, then even a country with subnational elections at multiple levels may be 
politically centralized. 
These three dimensions range from total decentralization to total centralization. 
Countries often function at a point somewhere midway between the two extremes, however. 
For example, a country may have subnational governments that are responsible for 
implementing some policies with the national government responsible for others. That country 
would fall part way along the spectrum towards administratively decentralized. In another 
country, subnational governments may be able to collect certain taxes or fees and control those 
resources while the national government collects its own taxes and does not share that revenue. 
That would be a case of partial fiscal decentralization.  
Decentralization in Federal and Unitary Systems. When decentralization is treated as a 
description of how a governmental system functions, it becomes clear that both federal and 
unitary countries (and confederations for that matter) may display different degrees of 
decentralization. Federal systems have institutionalized decentralization of authority, often 
explicitly defined in their constitutions, but many of them function in a more centralized manner 
than would be expected from the underlying structure. Likewise, many unitary systems function 
in a decentralized manner defined by their policy choices.  
 Fiscal decentralization varies from country to country based on the extent to which 
subnational governments have access to and control over their own revenues, whether or not 
they have taxing powers, the scope and magnitude of expenditures that they make relative to 
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the national government, the extent of dependency on transfers from the national government, 
and whether those transfers are conditional or not (Watts 2016, 17). Federal countries differ 
greatly from one another on the degree of fiscal decentralization that they empirically display; 
likewise, unitary countries vary along this dimension as well. To use one measurement of fiscal 
decentralization (Dziobek, Gutierrez Mangas, and Kufa 2011) as an example, the revenue raised 
by subnational governments as a percentage of total revenue ranges widely among federations 
and unitary systems, as shown in Table 1.1. I have chosen to present data from 1996 given that 
one of my decentralization models uses data from that year, but any year that was chosen would 
display a broad range similarly to this one. 
Table 1.1. Subnational Revenue (% of Total Revenue) in 1996 for Selected Countries 
Federal Countries Unitary Countries 
Country 
Subnational Revenue 
(%) Country 
Subnational Revenue 
(%) 
Malaysia 16.70 Chile 7.49 
Mexico 30.86 Thailand 8.96 
Austria 36.30 France 19.50 
Belgium 40.34 Peru 23.61 
Switzerland 63.15 Bolivia 38.65 
Canada 71.06 Denmark 57.13 
Source: calculated by the author using data compiled from IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (International Monetary Fund 2014) 
 
Subnational expenditure as a percent of total government expenditure is another measure of 
fiscal decentralization, and this too varies among federal and unitary countries, as shown in Table 
1.2. 
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Table 1.2. Subnational Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) in 1996 for Selected Countries 
Federal Countries Unitary Countries 
Country 
Subnational 
Expenditure (%) Country 
Subnational 
Expenditure (%) 
Malaysia 16.52 Thailand 9.61 
Austria 33.52 France 18.22 
Belgium 38.15 Peru 27.53 
USA 47.56 Sweden 38.73 
Canada 67.76 Denmark 55.81 
Source: calculated by the author using data compiled from IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (International Monetary Fund 2014) 
 
Subnational revenue and subnational expenditure as percentages of their respective 
totals vary between unitary and federal countries, as well. A two-sample t-test for the difference 
in mean subnational revenue percentages in 1996 (null hypothesis: no difference between the 
means) showed a significant difference (two-tailed p = .002127 < .05; 95% confidence interval for 
the difference: [15.07%, 24.31%]) with federal countries having a higher mean subnational 
revenue percentage. A two-sample t-test for the difference in mean subnational expenditure 
percentage (null hypothesis: no difference between the means) shows a significant difference 
(two-tailed p = .009396 < .05; 95% confidence interval for the difference: [14.54%, 23.17%]) 
between federal and unitary countries in 1996, with federal countries having a higher mean 
subnational expenditure percentage on average. While federal countries are higher on both 
these measures than unitary countries on average, there is still a substantial range – more than 
50 percentage points in all cases – within each category, showing that there is a difference both 
between and among federal and unitary systems on the dimension of fiscal decentralization.  
 Administrative decentralization is commonly conceptualized as comprising three steps 
that proceed from least to most decentralized: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution 
(Schneider 2003a). Deconcentration occurs when a national government establishes 
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geographically dispersed field offices that are responsible for implementing particular policies. 
Delegation occurs when a national government assigns implementation responsibility either to 
subnational governments or to outside agencies, who remain accountable to the national 
government for the results. Devolution occurs when national governments confer total 
responsibility and power over a policy to subnational governments. This dissertation views these 
three steps as a continuum from most centralized to most decentralized on the administrative 
dimension. All three steps may be taken regardless of whether a country is federal or unitary. 
Federal countries are more likely to have many of these choice made a priori in their 
constitutions, whereas unitary countries are more flexible in the choice to deconcentrate, 
delegate, or devolve power to subnational governments. 
 Federal countries are distinct from unitary countries in the degree of autonomy that 
subnational governments enjoy within their policy jurisdictions. In other words, while unitary 
countries may be substantially decentralized on the administrative dimension, and some federal 
countries may have a smaller scope of subnational policy responsibilities than their unitary 
counterparts, federations in particular “leave their constituent units with greater autonomy in 
the exercise of their responsibilities” (Watts 2016, 17). Watts assesses the autonomy of 
subnational governments within federations when it comes to expenditures (i.e. who decides 
how the money is spent at the subnational level) (Watts 2008). Figure 1.1 summarizes his 
assessment. 
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Figure 1.1. Autonomy Exercised by Subnational Governments Regarding Expenditures in Selected 
Federations 
 Least Subnational Autonomy     Most Subnational Autonomy 
    Most Centralized                   Most Decentralized 
 
Argentina, Comoros, 
Ethiopia, Malaysia, 
Micronesia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Russia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Australia, Austria, 
Brazil 
India, United States, 
Germany 
Belgium, Canada, 
Switzerland 
Source: (Watts 2008, 2016) 
 
 Schneider (2003b, 2003a) employs percentage of subnational revenue that comes from 
own-source taxes as a measure of administrative decentralization. This indicator captures the 
extent to which subnational governments control resources that they can direct towards their 
own policy priorities. While the indicator also captures something about fiscal decentralization, 
it gives a measure of the autonomy of the subnational governments in terms of who decides how 
resources are to be spent: the more revenue a subnational government collects from its own-
source taxes, the more policy autonomy it has. The percentage of subnational revenue that 
comes from own-source taxes varies among federations and unitary countries, as shown in Figure 
1.3. 
Table 1.3. Percentage of Subnational Revenue Derived from Own-Source Taxes in 1996* for 
Selected Countries 
Federal Countries Unitary Countries 
Country 
Subnational 
Expenditure (%) Country 
Subnational 
Expenditure (%) 
Austria 11.14 South Africa 5.56 
Belgium 16.10 Indonesia 20.11 
Malaysia (2000*) 28.71 Bolivia 36.58 
India 48.97 Mongolia 47.87 
Canada 54.63 Thailand 55.03 
Mexico 55.45 Chile 79.21 
19 
 
Source: calculated by the author using data compiled from IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (International Monetary Fund 2014) 
 Subnational revenues derived from own-source taxes may vary between federal and 
unitary systems, but there is no evidence that this was the case in 1996. A two-sample t-test for 
the difference in mean percentage of subnational revenues derived from own-sources taxes (null 
hypothesis: no difference between the means) showed no significant difference (two-tailed p = 
.7797 > .05) between federal and unitary systems. However, this variable does show substantial 
variation within system type, with a range of 44.32 percentage points in federal countries and a 
range of 77.56 percentage points in unitary ones. 
Politically decentralized countries have subnational representation. Functionally, 
however, subnational governments exist on a spectrum of effective jurisdiction and power. Along 
the political dimension, federal systems are clearly decentralized in structure – all federal systems 
that are democratic have elected officials at the subnational level. However, many unitary 
systems have local or subnational elections for specific offices as well. For example, France, which 
has a unitary constitution, has elected regional assemblies as well as local elections for city 
councils at the municipal level. Countries vary along the spectrum of political decentralization if 
the elected officials at different levels are not empowered to make autonomous decisions within 
their respective jurisdictions. In federal countries that have a single dominant political party, such 
as Mexico during the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), political power can 
remain extremely centralized with all decisions flowing from the national government, even 
when subnational officials are elected and ostensibly representing their local and regional 
constituencies. Likewise, if party discipline is high, even without a single dominant party, officials 
at the national government level may dominate decision-making at the lower levels of 
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government. In this way, political decentralization as an empirical reality may contrast from 
political decentralization as a structural feature of a governmental system. 
Conclusion. The foregoing discussion supports my decision to treat decentralization and 
federalism as two separate but related concepts in this dissertation. Decentralization will be 
measured as a functional matter using factor scores that separate the concept along its three 
dimensions. Federalism is treated as a dummy variable that scores a one for countries with 
federal constitutions, and zero otherwise. By including these variables in my analyses, I can 
measure and control for the effects of both federalism and decentralization, and by including 
interactions where relevant, I can measure the effects of federalism and decentralization 
combined. 
Decentralization and Food Security 
 Decentralization is a policy choice, and an increasingly prevalent one in developing 
countries (Jütting et al. 2005). This choice is made on the basis of strong theoretical arguments, 
but solid empirical evidence of positive social outcomes is often inconsistent or lacking (Ali Khan 
2013; Conyers 2007; Crawford 2008; Faguet 2004; Uchimara and Jütting 2009; Vedeld 2003; Von 
Braun and Grote 2000). In theory, decentralization improves efficiency, in the sense of satisfying 
the specific needs and preferences of the populace. Decentralization allows policies to be tailored 
to both local problems, and to local policy preferences. If all policy is set at the national level, this 
can lead to one-size-fits-all policies that may not effectively address problems as they manifest 
in different parts of a country. Decentralization also theoretically improves governance. Bringing 
the rulers closer to the ruled should increase accountability and stimulate participation when 
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people feel a greater degree of external political efficacy – that is, when they feel their actions 
have a real effect on political decision-making. 
 Decentralization should affect food security differentially along its three dimensions, and 
the MSA framework helps to separate out the expected effects. Political and administrative 
decentralization can be expected to have a positive effect on food security because of improved 
problem definition (the problem stream), improved targeting of policies (the policy stream), and 
greater opportunities for political pressure by affected groups (the politics stream). Political and 
administrative decentralization allow for more finely-grained and nuanced problem definition. 
Information about specific manifestations of food insecurity at the local level can be gathered, 
assessed, and contextualized more easily by bureaucrats and politicians with specific local2 level 
knowledge – and this type of knowledge is most likely to reside with local level officials. However, 
information-gathering is often resource intensive, and can only happen if sufficient fiscal 
resources are available and in the control of local officials. With good information can come 
better targeting of policies to local needs. Under political and administrative decentralization, 
policy choice and implementation are both local, and therefore policies can be tailored to the 
specific circumstances faced by food insecure people. In one state, the problem causing food 
insecurity may be drought, so irrigation policies may be the solution; whereas in another, the 
problem may be unemployment, so works programs would be a better fit. Under 
decentralization, this choice is possible. 
Finally, there are several ways in which politics are likely to be affected by 
decentralization. When local officials are empowered, they can become both a stimulus of and a 
                                                          
2 Local here can be taken to mean state/provincial or municipal – so, local as in not national. 
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target for mobilization and political pressure among local groups. Likewise, people who may feel 
that the national government would not heed their problems could be empowered to lobby local 
officials to make their concerns felt. Given the lack of resources among most people suffering 
from food insecurity, the lowered costs of participation and lobbying at the local level could make 
it easier to find ways to bring political pressure to bear. With all of this, however, the underlying 
assumption is that local governments have the resources they need to address the problems of 
their constituents, so fiscal decentralization is always a factor in how much decentralized 
governments can actually accomplish. 
Hypotheses: Fiscal, Administrative, and Political Decentralization. The foregoing discussion 
suggests three hypotheses, one for each dimension of decentralization: 
 H1: Countries that are fiscally decentralized will have more food security. 
 H2: Countries that are administratively decentralized will have more food security. 
 H3: Countries that are politically decentralized will have more food security. 
Separating decentralization into these three dimensions and testing each one will allow a more 
nuanced understanding of how decentralization affects food security. 
Federalism and Food Security 
Federalism is a formal government structure in which political power is shared between 
a government at the national level and sub-national units of governments at one or more levels. 
Formal federations are constitutionally defined. Federalism is often an impediment with respect 
to social welfare policy (Pierson 1995; Rodden 2010), partly because policymaking is a great deal 
more complicated under federalism, and partly because federalism can, and in many cases does, 
empower those who seek to constrain redistribution. In addition to answering the basic policy 
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question of what should be done, federal systems must answer a second question: who (i.e. what 
level of government) should do it? Empowered actors at all levels have an institutionalized say in 
what policies are adopted, and how they are implemented. Federalism complicates policy 
making, especially when it comes to redistributive policies like most of those that address food 
security, because it empowers subnational actors to an extent that wealthier regions of a country 
can block or avoid redistribution of their wealth to poorer regions. The proliferation of policy-
making venues under federalism provide more opportunities for opponents to stymie policies 
with which they disagree by venue shopping, and policy implementation is more complicated 
under federalism (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; Schattschneider 1975).  
Hypothesis: Food Security and Federalism. The foregoing discussion suggests that formal 
federalism may impede efforts to address food insecurity. Therefore, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 H4: Federations will have less food security. 
I now turn to a discussion of the data on which these hypotheses will be tested. 
Data Sources and Methods 
This dissertation uses quantitative methods to investigate the empirical relationships 
between the variables of interest: federalism; fiscal, administrative, and political 
decentralization; democracy; and, food insecurity. For this purpose, I have assembled a time-
series, cross-sectional dataset of all countries from 1990 to 2011. Each model presented in this 
dissertation draws on different subset of this dataset – none of them use the entire dataset, 
principally because the dependent variable is measured less frequently than many of the other 
variables it contains. All data are secondary – that is, I did not collect any primary data for this 
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dataset. Instead, I combined information that had already been gathered and published. The data 
are drawn from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS), Freedom House, the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and research published by Schneider 
(Schneider 2003a) and Cafiero et al (Cafiero et al. 2016). 
Democracy, federalism, and decentralization are the key independent variables. 
Democracy is measured along two dimensions using the Freedom House scales of political rights 
and civil liberties. Federalism is measured as a dummy variable that categorizes each country as 
federal or not, in each year. Decentralization is measured along its three dimensions – fiscal, 
administrative, and political – using factor scores developed by Schneider (2003a).  
My dependent variable in all analyses is food security. Food security is measured using a 
recoding of the Global Hunger Index (GHI), developed by Wiesmann (2002) and extended by 
IFPRI. The GHI combines three dimensions of food insecurity – undernourishment in the general 
population, child underweight, and child mortality – into one number, capturing some of the 
complexity that characterizes the problem. The GHI is calculated so that it increases as the 
indicators of hunger increase. However, this dissertation employs the concept of food security, 
which is inversely related to hunger. Therefore, to eliminate confusion and facilitate discussion, 
I recode the GHI into what will be called the Food Security Index (FSI). The FSI is the GHI 
subtracted from 100, thus reversing the scale and creating an index that increases as food 
security increases.  
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The problem of missing data, which is considerable in these measures, is addressed using 
multiple imputation (MI). Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
and regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). 
Chapter Organization 
Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation, establishes its contribution to the field, presents 
the theory and hypotheses to be tested, and provides an overview of the data sources and 
methods. Chapter 2 defines the central social welfare problem in this project: food insecurity. It 
provides a current picture of the state of food security in the world, and discusses the 
characteristics and consequences of food insecurity. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the 
theoretical and empirical relationship between social welfare and democracy, decentralization, 
and federalism, each in turn. Chapter 4 contains the empirical data analysis, presenting my 
models and findings. Chapter 5 discusses my findings and how they reflect on the research 
questions central to the dissertation. It also summarizes and contextualizes the foregoing 
chapters, and suggests further research to be done. 
Conclusion 
Democracy, decentralization, and federalism all structure the balance of interests in 
political systems. Both decentralization and democracy are often argued to enhance 
accountability, and therefore responsiveness of government. But is this the case in practice? 
What about federations? Are they better equipped to provide food security? This dissertation 
will examine how democracy, decentralization, and federalism affect one specific social welfare 
problem: food insecurity. 
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CHAPTER 2 FOOD INSECURITY: A GLOBAL PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Food insecurity is a daily reality for millions of people. For centuries, food insecurity and 
hunger were not understood to be political problems; they were considered to be inherent in the 
human condition. Malthus (1872) famously theorized in the 19th century that any species, 
humans no exception, will increase its population until it outstrips the sources of nourishment, 
triggering misery, famine, and death. This was presented as inevitable and inexorable. The 
Malthusian definition indicated two possible strategies: population control, and increased food 
production. However, in his formulation, the problem had no real solution; more food meant 
more population, and a growing population would inevitably outgrow its source of food. In the 
20th century, other theorists began to chip away at the subject of food insecurity.  
De Castro (1972) wrote The Geopolitics of Hunger in 1952. He pointed out that hunger 
was an ignored problem, discussion of which was almost taboo, and that its causes lay in the 
failure of society to recognize and attack food insecurity as something other than an economic 
and personal failure. Speaking in the context of the Brazilian experience, de Castro pointed out 
that colonialism and the imposed system of agricultural production, land distribution, and land 
use were major causes of food insecurity. Sen (1983) examined famines that occurred in India in 
years when there was a surplus of food production, and found that hunger was caused by a failure 
of accessibility: distribution of food, not its availability, was the central issue. Thinkers like these 
began to sketch a different picture of food insecurity: not as an inevitability or a condition of life, 
but a choice made by societies – a choice that could be unmade. The problem began to be 
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recognized as a political problem, and food insecurity came to be defined as a failure of public 
policy. 
The market comprises the primary food distribution system of the world today, and many 
analysts still view the market as the main solution to food insecurity (Leathers and Foster 2004). 
However, for people facing chronic food insecurity, the market has failed. Poor consumers do not 
have enough money to register demand for food – if they did, they would buy the food they need 
–  and so the market will not serve them. They rely mostly on their governments to fill the gap. 
What causes some governments to adopt policies that fight food insecurity? What conditions 
make governments pay attention to this problem? Under what circumstances are food security 
policies more effective? What determines the success of public policies to alleviate food 
insecurity? This dissertation examines food insecurity defined as a political problem with 
solutions rooted in public policy. In order to do that, food security must be clearly defined and 
measured. That is the goal of this chapter. 
The Dimensions of Food Security 
Food security is the state of all people, at all times, having access to enough safe and 
nutritious food to lead a healthy and productive life (FAO 2009). Food security is a complex 
concept. It consists of at minimum three dimensions: availability, access, and utilization. These 
dimensions are ordered. Food cannot be accessible unless it is available. Likewise, food must be 
both available and accessible before it can be utilized. However, none of the three is sufficient 
for food security. Food security exists where the three dimensions converge: when enough food 
is available, accessible, and utilized. Food insecurity is defined in the negative: it is the lack of 
food security. Food insecurity exists when there is a failure along any of the three dimensions. 
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Food security and insecurity occur at many different levels of analysis. For example, an individual 
or a city can be food secure; likewise, a country or a region can be food insecure.  
Food security begins with availability. Enough food is available when the food supply is 
large enough and diverse enough to satisfy the energy and nutritional needs of every person in a 
population. Is there enough food available? Is sufficient food being grown or imported? Is food 
available in all geographic areas? Food insecurity is unavoidable when the available food is 
insufficient to meet the needs of a person or a population of people.  
Yet overall population-level food availability is not sufficient to resolve food insecurity. 
Until Sen’s (1983) seminal work on famines, availability was thought to be the central problem 
and food security was assumed to exist if the food supply was large enough to satisfy the caloric 
needs of a population. Sen examined famines that occurred during times of plenty and concluded 
that there was another crucial piece of the puzzle. He found that people starved when there was 
food available because they could not gain access to the food. In so doing, Sen identified the 
second dimension of food security: accessibility. 
Accessibility is the degree to which people can gain control over the available food. Access 
is itself a multidimensional concept. Access to food may be economic, physical, or social. 
Economic access consists of the ability to exchange economic resources for food. Food may be 
bought on the open market given sufficient funds; work may be exchanged directly for food; or 
economic resources such as land and labor can be utilized to grow food. When the resources a 
person or a population commands are insufficient to acquire enough food in enough quantity 
and variety to maintain health, food insecurity is the result. Physical access is determined by 
where food is located relative to people. The available food must be reasonably proximate, or 
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transportation systems must be well-developed and distributed enough to move food 
expeditiously to the people who need it. Food insecurity results when food is an unreasonable 
(defined contextually) distance from the people who need it. Finally, access to food has a social 
dimension. In order for food security to exist, people must be able to access it in socially 
acceptable ways. Resorting to strategies like stealing or scavenging indicates food insecurity. The 
social dimension of access also includes the idea of a socially acceptable diet; that is, a diet that 
is appropriate in the cultural context. Resorting to foods that are not culturally acceptable is an 
indication of food insecurity. 
Is the food that is available accessible to everyone? If people are dependent on the wages 
they earn, do they have enough income to buy sufficient food? If not, are there alternative 
resources they can use to acquire food such as government programs for vouchers or direct food 
distribution? If they are farmers, do they have the resources to grow enough food? Can people 
get enough of a variety of foods or must they limit themselves to only a few, low-quality foods? 
Can people get food in socially acceptable ways or do they have to resort to strategies that are 
outside the norm? Is the food they can access part of a culturally acceptable diet? If the answer 
to any of these questions is negative, then food accessibility is lacking. A failure of accessibility is 
a dimension of food insecurity.  
The third dimension of food security is utilization. Is the food that is available and 
accessible being utilized properly? Utilization failures can fall into two categories: external and 
internal. External utilization refers to the things external to the physical body that are necessary 
to properly use food. Two major external factors important for utilization are clean water and 
sanitation. If no clean water is available or if sanitation is lacking, it becomes difficult to handle 
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food in a safe and sanitary manner. Another external failure of utilization is food spoilage and 
waste. This can be a result of improper handling, or it can be due to lack of storage capability. 
Internal utilization factors refer to how a person’s body processes food. A normally developed, 
healthy body will process everything it needs from food, given an adequate diet. An unhealthy or 
underdeveloped body, however, will often not be able to obtain the maximal benefit from food. 
Disease can cause malabsorption of nutrients. This facet of food insecurity is examined in more 
detail below. Figure 2.1 summarizes the foregoing discussion. 
Figure 2.1. Food Security in Three Dimensions 
 
 
Food Insecurity: What Does It Mean for the Individual? 
Technical definitions of food insecurity sometimes mask the fact that food insecurity is a 
lived experience for millions of people every day. A great deal of work has been done to discover 
the commonalities in experience of food insecurity; it is remarkably similar across cultural 
Availability
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Food 
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contexts (Ballard, Kepple, and Cafiero 2013). Food insecurity starts with concern and worry about 
getting food or about running out of food, about not having enough resources to obtain sufficient 
food. It intensifies as people begin to substitute lower quality foods and reduce the variety of 
foods they eat because they lack the means to do otherwise. They may shift either to foods or to 
ways of acquiring food that are less culturally acceptable, and these actions cause them to feel 
shame. Next, people start to skip meals and limit portions to stretch their supply of food. Finally, 
they go hungry, not eating for a day or more. While this dissertation relies on other more 
traditional ways of measuring food security, increasing attention is turning to food insecurity 
understood in this manner (cf. Ballard, Kepple, and Cafiero 2013; Cafiero et al. 2016; Coates et 
al. 2006), measured by using surveys to gather information about the experiences and coping 
strategies of people living under these circumstances. 
Food Insecurity: The Physical Consequences 
Food provides two main categories of resources to the body, both of which are essential 
for health and life. The first resource provided by food is calories. Calories are a measure of 
energy, and this energy is necessary to run all the processes of the body. Muscle contractions 
such as heart beats, the physical process of digestion, nerve impulses, respiration, and physical 
movement all require calories of energy to happen. The second category of resources provided 
by food is nutrients. Nutrients are chemicals that make up the physical aspect of the body, or that 
take part in bodily processes. Nutrients like protein provide the amino acids needed to construct 
enzymes that enable body functions, as well as physical structures like cells, muscles and other 
tissues of the body. Vitamins and minerals are chemical compounds that are necessary in 
sufficient amounts for healthy body structures and proper bodily function. For example, the 
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mineral iron is necessary for hemoglobin, a molecule in the blood that carries oxygen throughout 
the body. Vitamin A is a vital component of the retina in the eye, enabling eyesight. All of the 
necessary nutrients are available in food, and people can get everything they need from food 
when they are food secure.  
Food insecurity is the state of not having enough food, and further, not having enough 
nutritious food. It may be due to failures of availability, access, utilization, or combinations 
thereof. Chronic food insecurity manifests in the human body as two physical conditions: 
undernourishment and undernutrition. Undernourishment is the lack of sufficient calories; that is, 
a person suffering from undernourishment cannot access enough food to meet his or her daily 
energy requirement. Undernutrition is the lack of sufficient nutrients; that is, a person suffering 
from undernutrition is lacking a sufficient amount of one or more key nutrients, such as protein, 
vitamin A, zinc, or other vitamins and minerals. Another way to say the same thing is that 
undernourishment results from an insufficient quantity of food, whereas undernutrition results 
from an insufficient quality of food (Waterlow 1997). The two conditions are distinct because 
neither is necessary nor sufficient for the other. A person can have enough calories, but if the 
diet is insufficiently varied then they may lack of one or more key nutrients to the point of lasting 
harm. Likewise, a person may have a nutritious enough diet in that there is no specific nutrient 
so lacking as to cause permanent harm, but may not be able to regularly consume enough 
calories to maintain a healthy and productive life. Finally, the two can be concurrent in the same 
individual. Figure 2.2 summarizes this discussion. 
 
33 
 
Figure 2.2. Food Insecurity: Primary Physical Conditions 
 
Undernourishment and undernutrition, separately or together, cause a host of 
measurable effects. In children, undernourishment and undernutrition can cause stunting (low 
height for age). Stunting in particular indicates chronically insufficient food for normal growth 
(Waterlow 1972). In both children and adults, undernourishment leads to underweight (low 
weight for age) and wasting (low weight for height). Wasting in particular indicates acute food 
insecurity that has caused weight loss in the shorter term. A person can be underweight as a 
result of either wasting or stunting, so this indicator captures food insecurity both in the short- 
and long-term (Black et al. 2008).  
Undernutrition leads to a host of different diseases directly caused by vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies. Undernutrition and undernourishment also increase susceptibility to infectious and 
chronic illnesses and diseases. In turn, disease has a reciprocal effect on both undernutrition and 
undernourishment. For example, diseases that cause acute diarrhea render individuals unable to 
Undernourishment Undernutrition
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properly absorb nutrients, exacerbating undernutrition. In adults, illness may lead to low 
productivity or even a total inability to work. Even absent illness, chronic undernourishment leads 
to low productivity due to weakness and lack of endurance. In both of these ways, food insecurity 
compromises adults’ ability to work and thereby produce food or earn wages to buy food, which 
in turn exacerbates food insecurity. Undernutrition and undernourishment in children leads to 
cognitive effects that may last a lifetime. Finally, undernourishment and undernutrition can lead 
to increased mortality, especially in children but, in acute cases, in adults as well. Figure 2.3 
summarizes this discussion.
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The literature about food security and food insecurity is rife with different descriptive 
words and varieties of measurement (FIVIMS 2002; A. D. Jones et al. 2013). A number of concepts 
occur regularly that appear to be synonyms for food insecurity, but important and sometimes 
subtle nuances exist. Mixing concepts and using distinct words interchangeably can easily lead to 
conceptual confusion. The word hunger appears frequently in discussions of food insecurity. 
Hunger can mean (at minimum) two different things. One is a physical feeling that individuals get 
when they have not eaten for a period of time. Hunger in this sense functions as the body’s signal 
that it has a need for food. A second use of hunger is to refer to the situation I have defined as 
food insecurity. This use of hunger can apply at the individual, national, regional, or global level. 
Hunger is an evocative term, and one with an emotional impact, because it allows the reader to 
directly relate to the topic at hand – readers of this research have certainly experienced hunger 
in the first sense. Ironically, people who are chronically undernourished (i.e. hungry in the second 
sense) often cease to feel the physical sensation of hunger, and those who suffer from 
undernutrition will often experience no hunger (in the first sense) related to that condition. 
Malnutrition is another word used frequently to refer to undernourishment and undernutrition, 
but it has also come to encompass overnourishment, overweight, and obesity in the literature. 
Primary malnutrition refers to undernourishment and undernutrition due to a lack of food; 
secondary malnutrition refers to the malabsorption of nutrients that occurs due to disease. In 
general, these terms will only be used in this project when referring to other works. 
The Magnitude and Scope of the Problem 
How many people are food insecure? The answer depends on what measurement is used. 
Different measures capture different dimensions of food insecurity. 
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One of the most commonly cited measurements of food insecurity is the FAO’s prevalence 
of undernourishment (PoU). This measure combines data on food supply and household 
consumption to estimate the probability that a randomly drawn individual in a country will be 
undernourished – i.e. unable to get enough food to meet their daily caloric requirement. This 
probability can then be converted into a percentage or into a raw number of people. Thus, the 
PoU attempts to capture both availability and access. The PoU estimates that in 2015, 795 million 
people were undernourished (FAO, IFAD, and WFP 2015). This amounts to just over one in nine 
people worldwide. The geographical distribution of food insecurity as measured by the PoU is 
shown in Figure 2.4. It is worth noting that the PoU uses a threshold of the minimum calories to 
maintain a sedentary life – the minimum calorie requirements for an active life would be higher, 
and using that threshold would define even more people as food insecure. 
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 Another way to directly measure food security – specifically the access dimension – is to 
use survey questions. In the 1990s, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
developed an eighteen question survey module called the Household Food Security Survey 
Module (HFSSM) that sought to measure both the presence and the severity of the experience 
of food insecurity at the household level (Kennedy 2002). The survey questions inquire whether 
households, given their level of money or resources, could acquire enough food, or if they had to 
adopt strategies such as limiting types of food, eating less food, or going without food. The 
answers to the questions allowed a household to be rated on a scale of four categories: food 
Figure 2.4. Distribution of Undernourished People by Region (%), 2015
Southern Asia (35.4%)
Sub-Saharan Africa (27.7%)
Eastern Asia (18.3%)
South-Eastern Asia (7.6%)
Latin America (3.4%)
Western Asia (2.4%)
Developed Regions (1.8%)
Caribbean (0.9%)
Caucasus and Central Asia
(0.7%)
Northern Africa (0.5%)
Oceania (0.2%)
Source: FAO 2015
Note: These numbers are three-year average estimates of the prevalence of undernutrition (PoU) from 2014 to 2016. 
The sum is 99% due to rounding errors.
Total Undernourished
= 795 million
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secure; mild food insecurity; moderate food insecurity; and severe food insecurity.3 International 
attention has turned to this scale, and it has been adapted to and validated in many developing 
country contexts (cf. Coates, Swindale, and Bilinsky 2007; Magaña-Lemus et al. 2016; Melgar-
Quinonez et al. 2006; Villagómez-Ornelas et al. 2014). Most recently, the FAO has instituted the 
Voices of the Hungry (VoH) project that deployed a version of the scale called the Food Insecurity 
Experience Scale4 (FIES) in the annual Gallup World Poll (GWP) starting in 2014 (Cafiero et al. 
2016). The first deployment of the FIES covered 146 countries, and found that 1.01 billion people 
over 15 years of age in those countries experienced moderate or severe food insecurity in the 
previous 12 months. Of these, 375 million people experienced severe food insecurity. 
 By far the most plentiful measures of food insecurity are measures of utilization – how 
well the food that is available and accessible is used by the bodies of the people eating it. 
Utilization failures show up as both undernutrition and undernourishment. Undernutrition 
causes deficiencies of important nutrients. As of 2013, more than 2 billion people suffered from 
deficiencies in crucial micronutrients such as iodine, iron, vitamin A, and zinc, -- i.e. they lived 
                                                          
3 A food secure household does not report experiencing any food insecurity: it has access to sufficient food of the 
quality and type that the inhabitants prefer. All of the food insecure categories are cumulative – e.g people who 
are in households with severe food insecurity are also experiencing mild and moderate food insecurity. Inhabitants 
of a household experiencing mild food insecurity (sometimes called food insecure without hunger) worry about 
running out of food, sometimes do run out of food, and adopt strategies to stretch their food supply such as eating 
a lower quality diet or a smaller variety of foods than they would if they were food secure. Adults living in 
households with moderate food insecurity (sometimes called food insecure with moderate hunger) begin skipping 
meals and reducing portions, and they may lose weight from undereating; children in these households are fed a 
less balanced diet, and may not eat enough overall. Severe food insecurity (sometimes called food insecure with 
severe hunger) brings smaller portions, chronically skipped meals, and entire days without food for both adults 
and children.[(Kennedy 2002)] 
4 The FIES module comprises eight questions that asked about food insecurity experiences over the past twelve 
months (Cafiero et al. 2016, Table 2-1, 7). During the validation process, these questions were found to conform to 
theoretical assumptions that they consistently measure escalating severity of food insecurity. Seven of the 
questions asked about individual experiences, and the remaining one asked about the individual’s household. 
Affirmative answers on four to seven questions scored as moderate food insecurity; affirmative answers on all 
eight qualified as severe food insecurity. 
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with undernutrition -- due to a poor quality or insufficient diet (IFPRI 2014). Between 1995 and 
2005, an average of 33 percent of children under five and 15 percent of pregnant women were 
deficient in vitamin A as measured by blood tests (Black et al. 2013). Another way that vitamin A 
deficiency is determined is by incidence of night blindness; 1 percent of children under five and 
8 percent of pregnant women had night blindness on average in that time period. In 2011, 18 
percent of children under five and 19 percent of pregnant women had iron deficiency anemia – 
i.e. the type of anemia that can be corrected with adequate dietary iron or supplementation 
(Black et al. 2013). In 2005, 17 percent of people globally were deficient in zinc, and iodine 
deficiency stood at 29 percent of the global population in 2013 (Black et al. 2013). These statistics 
reveal a widespread problem with food insecurity. 
The World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, and the World Bank (2015) release 
estimates each year of the number of children under the age of five suffering from the effects of 
food insecurity, which are stunting, wasting, underweight, and mortality, each of which will be 
defined below. These estimates are based on household surveys carried out in 150 countries and 
territories and they allow inferences to be made about the entire population of 667 million 
children under five in the world in 2014.  
Stunting is defined as low height for age, and a child is considered stunted when he or she 
is more than two standard deviations below the mean for the population to which the child 
belongs. Stunting is the result of chronic food insecurity, and is often not remediable once it sets 
in – at a certain age, height becomes permanent so limited early growth cannot be made up 
indefinitely. In 2014, 159 million, or 23.8 percent, of children under five worldwide were stunted.  
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 Wasting is defined as low weight for height. Wasting occurs when a child faces acute food 
insecurity – that is, an often short-term, drastic reduction in the amount of food. This happens 
during famine, and also during other times of food shortfall that do not qualify as famine. A child 
is classified as wasted if he or she is more than two standard deviations below the mean for the 
reference population to which the child belongs, and severely wasted at more than three 
standard deviations below the mean. Wasting is caused by acute and severe undernourishment, 
but it is almost always remediable with feeding. In 2014, 50 million, or 7.5 percent, of children 
under five were wasted, and of those, one-third were severely wasted, which amounts to 2.4 
percent, or 16 million, of all children under five.  
 Underweight is defined as low weight for age. A child is classified as underweight if he or 
she is more than two standard deviations below the mean for age and sex in the reference 
population to which the child belongs. In 2011, the global proportion of children under five who 
were underweight was 16 percent, or 101 million (Black et al. 2013). Underweight as a category 
can encompass both children who are stunted and children who are wasted. 
 Mortality is the most extreme result of chronic food insecurity. Mortality is caused by 
food insecurity directly and indirectly. The following mortality figures are for children under five 
years of age in 2011 (Black et al. 2013). The number of children in that age group who died in 
2011 was 6,934,000. Estimates of child mortality attributable to stunting range, depending on 
the method of estimation, from 14.7 percent to 17 percent of total deaths in that age group, 
which amounts to 1.02 million to 1.2 million children (Black et al. 2013). 14.4 percent to 17 
percent (1 million to 1.2 million) of child deaths in 2011 were attributable to underweight. 
Wasting (including severe wasting) caused 11.5 to 12.6 percent (800,000 to 875,000) of the 
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mortality in children under five; 7.4 to 7.8 percent (516,000 to 540,000) was attributable to 
severe wasting. Zinc deficiency accounted for 1.7 percent of mortality or 116,000 children, and 
vitamin A deficiency led to 2.3 percent or 157,000 deaths of children under five in 2011. These 
percentages cannot be added to get the total percentage of mortality attributable to nutrition 
deficiencies because many conditions overlap in the same individuals. Still, it is estimated that 
jointly, 44.7 to 45.4 percent of mortality of children under five in 2011 was attributable to 
nutritional deficiencies (Black et al. 2013). Food insecurity causes mortality most often because 
of increased susceptibility to and severity of disease. A study of 53 developing countries found 
that 56 percent of deaths of children under five “were attributable to malnutrition’s5 [disease] 
potentiating effects, and 83% of these were attributable to mild-to-moderate as opposed to 
severe malnutrition” (Pelletier et al. 1995, 443). Depending on the country, the effect of 
malnutrition ranged from 13 to 66 of child mortality, with a minimum of three-quarters of 
mortality due to malnutrition ascribed to mild-to-moderate malnutrition, as opposed to severe. 
 Utilization measures capture the dire effects of food insecurity, but they are problematic 
in that they also capture conditions that are caused by things other than food insecurity. 
However, given the ease with which anthropometric measurements, especially on children, can 
be gathered, these are sometimes the only measures available to assess food security. Over time 
they reveal patterns, even though each individual measurement may reflect other factors as well. 
Conclusion 
This chapter defines food security conceptually along three dimensions: availability, 
accessibility, and utilization. Food insecurity manifests in the individual as undernourishment 
                                                          
5 Pelletier et al. (1995) use underweight to measure malnutrition. 
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(lack of calories) and undernutrition (lack of nutrients). Food insecurity affects the survival and 
health of millions of people around the world. This chapter has sought to provide a conceptual 
basis and a statistical picture of the scope of the problem. 
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CHAPTER 3 POLITICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE: WHAT DO WE KNOW? 
Introduction 
Food security is of fundamental importance to social welfare. This dissertation examines 
how democracy, federalism, and centralization are related to food security – specifically whether 
they enhance food security at the national level in developing countries. The relationship 
between both democracy, federalism, and decentralization to social welfare is an active area of 
scholarship, although food security as a specific outcome has not been studied to any great 
extent. This chapter presents a review of the literature. Firstly, this literature review examines 
the relationship between democracy and social welfare as it has been framed, operationalized, 
measured, and tested in the existing literature. Secondly, it turns to federalism and 
decentralization and how they relate to social welfare outcomes. 
Democracy and Social Welfare 
A number of scholars have investigated the relationship between democracy and social 
welfare. Social welfare comprises an extremely broad subject area; therefore, it has been 
defined, measured, and operationalized in several different ways. In the study of democracy and 
social welfare, a common approach has been to use social spending as a proxy for social welfare 
(Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; 
Stasavage 2005). Most studies that use this approach assume that increases in social spending 
entail a positive effect on social welfare outcomes; papers that take this approach will be 
discussed briefly. A few scholars have increased the scope of measurement to include social 
service provision (Harding and Stasavage 2014; Lake and Baum 2001) or social welfare outcomes 
directly measured (Lake and Baum 2001; Ross 2006); a subset of these have used outcome 
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measures that relate to food insecurity (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 
2009; Ross 2006).  
Democracy itself has been operationalized in a variety of ways in the study of the 
relationship between democracy and social welfare. The approaches include operationalizing 
democracy as: a dummy variable for democracy and authoritarianism (Avelino, Brown, and 
Hunter 2005; Brown and Hunter 1999); a dummy variable based on multiparty competition for 
the executive (Stasavage 2005); a three-category range from authoritarian to democracy 
(Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009); and a variety of recodes of the Polity III and Polity IV 
autocracy-democracy scale (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Lake 
and Baum 2001; Ross 2006) often paired with robustness checks using the Freedom House 
democracy measures (Lake and Baum 2001; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009). Summarizing 
this literature and bringing it to bear on the current topic – democracy and food security – is a 
challenge. 
Democracy and Social Spending. In the literature on democracy and social welfare, social welfare 
is often operationalized in terms of social spending. Some studies look at aggregate social 
spending while others separate it into different types, such as social security, health, or education 
spending. Most employ the implicit assumption that such spending leads to better social 
outcomes, especially for the poor. Many of these studies are limited to a single region.  
Latin America has been a frequent source of data to test the relationship between 
democracy and social welfare. Brown and Hunter (1999) examined aggregate social spending on 
health, education, and social security in 17 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1992 and found 
that authoritarian countries were more responsive to economic factors and democracies were 
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more responsive to political pressure and demographic changes; low-income democracies were 
especially likely to spend more than their authoritarian counterparts. Authoritarian systems were 
quicker to cut social spending in the face of economic downturns than democracies were. 
Avelino, Brown, and Hunter (2005) studied 19 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1999 and 
found that democracy was associated with increased social spending, particularly on human 
capital formation in the face of globalization. Democracies were found to protect social programs 
more than authoritarian countries, especially programs with large constituencies, but also those 
with small but politically powerful constituencies. In contrast, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
(2001) examined 14 Latin American countries from 1973 to 1997 and found democracies no 
different than authoritarian regimes in terms of aggregate social spending or responsiveness to 
economic downturns. When social spending was disaggregated into social security spending and 
spending on human capital (i.e. health and education), democracies were found to spend more 
on human capital than both authoritarian and popularly based (those dependent on organized 
labor or oriented towards the popular sector) regimes. 
Stasavage (2005) examined democracy and education spending in 44 African countries 
between 1980 and 1996. He theorized that with the onset of democracy, rural groups in these 
countries would have more political power than they did under authoritarian regimes. Urban 
groups would be similarly empowered no matter the regime type, since urban unrest is a 
perennial peril to governments whether democratic or authoritarian. Rural groups prioritize 
primary education over university level education, and urban groups favor university funding. 
Therefore, Stasavage hypothesized that if it is true that democracies are more responsive to 
newly empowered constituencies, then, as they become democratic, regimes should increase 
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service provision (operationalized here as education spending) and distribute those service 
increases accordingly. Stasavage found that countries with multiparty competition for the 
executive (the operationalization of democracy employed in this study) had higher education 
spending overall, and this was driven by increased spending on primary education while 
university funding stayed constant, supporting the contention that democratic politicians will 
tailor their actions to newly empowered groups. 
These studies examined social spending as a proxy for social welfare. On balance, 
democracy was found to have a positive effect on social spending in most cases. These studies 
were limited to certain regions, and they do not provide evidence that increases in social 
spending have had positive impacts on social welfare outcomes. 
Democracy and Social Service Provision. The literature has several different foci when it comes 
to democracy and social welfare. Some studies examined the relationship between democracy 
and social service provision, which is a more proximate measure for social welfare than social 
spending. Other studies look at social welfare outcomes directly. When outcomes are tested, 
democracy’s effect becomes more complex. 
An influential and oft-cited study by Lake and Baum (2001) examined nine social service 
provision measures6 and eight social welfare outcomes and found that democracy has a generally 
positive effect in comparison to authoritarian systems. This study employed 17 cross-sectional 
                                                          
6 Lake and Baum (2001) test 17 total measures. While their study employs all of them as measures of provision of 
public services (Lake and Baum 2001, 600–602, Table 1), this dissertation makes a conceptual distinction between 
social service provision and social welfare outcomes. Therefore, the literature review will consider the two 
categories of measures separately. Social service provision is measured as: primary school pupil-teacher ratio; 
health care access; clean water access: total, rural, and urban; population per physician; attended births; DPT and 
measles immunizations. Social welfare outcomes are measured by: adult illiteracy; persistence in school to fourth 
grade; primary, secondary, and tertiary school gross enrollment ratios; crude death rate; infant mortality rate; and 
life expectancy at birth.   
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analyses and five time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analyses using data from between 37 and 110 
countries, depending on the measure in question, from the years 1970 to 1992. Among the 
studies discussed in this literature review, this study is one of the few that includes both 
developing and developed countries, although the authors indicate that the inclusion of high-
income countries did not bias the results (Lake and Baum 2001, 603). While the magnitude varied 
across indicators, in all but six of the 38 cross-sections, democracy had a strong and positive effect 
(appropriately scaled by indicator – positive here represents an improvement) compared to 
authoritarian systems. The five TSCS analyses examined democracy’s association with secondary 
school enrollment ratio (yearly from 1975-1993), safe water access (every three years from 1985-
1994), measles and DPT immunizations (every 3 years from 1986-1995 for both), and infant 
mortality (every five years from 1967-1992), all measured in first differences – the change in level 
from the prior time period to the current time period. In all cases democracy was strongly 
associated with positive changes as compared with authoritarian regimes. The authors conclude 
that democracy is associated with higher levels of public services worldwide. 
Harding and Stasavage (2014) examine the question of democracy and social service 
provision in 29 African countries between 1980 and 2007. They ask several related questions. 
Does democracy lead to greater social service provision? If so, what types of social services can 
democracy be expected to increase or improve? Finally, does democracy lead to better social 
outcomes through higher service provision? Their argument rests on the time horizons and goals 
of politicians within new democracies with weak state capacity. Under democracy, politicians will 
seek to provide social services in order to fulfill campaign promises and to build electoral support. 
However, in a context of weak state capacity, it is difficult for voters to attribute blame or credit 
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for many types of policy actions, and so politicians will tend to implement changes and services 
for which the credit is easily attributable. When it comes to education provision, such a politician, 
faced with the choice to improve school inputs (by providing more teachers) or abolishing school 
fees, will choose the directly attributable action of abolishing school fees. Abolishing school fees 
is an example of social service provision that should result in higher attendance, but this raises 
questions about the quality of the services provided. Indeed, Harding and Stasavage find that 
under democracy, school attendance is higher and that this effect is due to the abolishing of 
primary school fees. However, teacher-pupil ratios also are higher under democracy because 
these less attributable inputs do not keep pace with the higher enrollments – so, while 
democracy does provide more services, service quality is not necessarily enhanced. Finally, 
Harding and Stasavage present survey evidence from Kenya that voters indeed make decisions 
to support politicians based on campaign promises to abolish school fees.  
Democracy and Social Welfare: A Complicated Picture. The Harding and Stasavage study brings 
nuance to the debate about democracy and social welfare. Whereas previous studies expected 
and tested the positive effect of democracy, this study points out that democracy may have a 
positive effect on some outcome indicators, but that this may come at the expense of other 
indicators. Rather than considering democracy as a monotonically positive influence on social 
welfare, perhaps it is important to consider exactly how democracy works in practice, and how 
the pragmatic politics that attend elections and re-elections might influence the choice of social 
welfare options that democratic politicians are likely to support. 
Harding and Stasavage were not the first to question whether democratic politics may 
hinder the effectiveness of social welfare efforts. Varshney (2000) addressed this question by 
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asking why long-standing democracies (defined as countries that had maintained democracy for 
more than half the time since the late 1940s or since a particular country’s independence) have 
not eliminated poverty. Poverty is conceptualized in terms of malnourishment, and defined as 
the percent of the population living on less than $1 (PPP) per day – the amount needed to 
maintain a minimum caloric intake for body functions (Varshney 2000, 724). Using a small-N 
comparative design, Varshney compared 8 democracies to 15 authoritarian countries and found 
that democracies have a moderate record on poverty alleviation (and no democratic country has 
ignored the problem) while authoritarian countries run the range from best to worst. He argued 
that in authoritarian countries, governments must satisfy the elite (who are not food-insecure) 
but that these countries may attack poverty if there is an ideological reason to do so or if an elite 
coalition forms behind poverty alleviation. In democracies, the government must serve the needs 
of the electorate, which in developing countries will be disproportionately poor. This would lead 
one to believe that democratic governments would vigorously attack poverty, but the fact that 
poverty alleviation has been only moderate under long-term democracy shows that this is not 
the case.  
Varshney argues that the pattern of moderate poverty alleviation (but not elimination) 
by democracies may be due to two different characteristics of democratic politics. First, he 
differentiates between indirect and direct methods of poverty alleviation: indirect methods are 
growth-mediated and include market-oriented reforms, currency devaluation, and liberalizing 
trade; whereas direct methods include distribution of food, income, or assets to the poor 
(Varshney 2000, 722–23). Democratic politicians with short time horizons extending little past 
the next election, faced with an impoverished electorate, will opt for the direct methods rather 
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than seek to build support for indirect policies that may pay off in the long run but will also cause 
short term disruption. In fact, the reason Varshney posits for authoritarian poverty alleviation 
success stories is precisely that in those countries, politicians had the ability to adopt and impose 
unpopular policies because they were not accountable to any but the elite – who usually 
benefited from such policies. The direct methods will alleviate the most severe forms of poverty, 
but may not solve the larger structural issues that, if addressed, can lead to long-term and more 
successful poverty alleviation. Second, Varshney points out that while people may be divided into 
the poor and the well-off, the poor are not a monolithic group that will vote on economic self-
interest alone. The poor as a group are divided along ethnic, religious, and geographical lines to 
name just a few, and they may vote along those lines instead of supporting anti-poverty 
politicians as a voting bloc. Thus, the effect of the large numbers of impoverished voters may be 
attenuated at the ballot box. 
Both Varshney (2000) and Harding and Stasavage (2014) shed light on the complexity of 
the links between democracy and social welfare. While the poor make up a large portion of the 
electorate in most developing countries, it does not automatically follow that the interests of the 
poor as an economic bloc will be addressed by democratic governments. In order for that to 
happen, those interests must first be coherently expressed at the ballot box. Even in that case, 
democratic politics may sometimes work against effective policy action. The politician who wants 
to be re-elected may not be able to effectively advocate for optimal policies, and may instead 
opt for more easily explained solutions or quick fixes that do not address the underlying issue in 
the long run. For both these reasons, we may not always observe positive social welfare changes 
in democracies when compared with authoritarian systems, or the picture may be mixed, albeit 
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in predictable ways. As this discussion related to food insecurity, however, the short time 
horizons of democratic politicians may work in favor of ameliorating food insecurity. Short-term 
food and voucher provision programs can be very successful in providing food security, even if 
they are not long-term fixes. 
Democracy and Food Security. No project on food security and democracy can be complete 
without making mention of Amartya Sen’s seminal and extensive work on democracy and famine 
(Dreze and Sen 1991; Sen 1982, 1983, 1996). Sen found that historically, famines have often 
occurred in years when food production was more than sufficient to cover nutritional needs. This 
fact led him to the insight that food supply is only part of the equation in food security; an equally 
important aspect is food distribution – what is now called food accessibility. Sen first defined 
entitlements – the bundle of resources (both monetary and nonmonetary) that people can 
exchange for food – and traced the cause of famine to entitlement failure. Different groups within 
society have different levels of entitlements, which are the result of both market activity and, to 
a large extent – especially for the most vulnerable – government policy. During normal times, 
they can exchange these entitlements for enough food to live and thrive. Certain groups in 
society are more vulnerable than others to entitlement failure, which may be caused by 
environmental or economic disaster. Widespread entitlement failure causes famine.  
Sen used comparative case studies to draw the conclusion that democracy protects 
against famine (Sen 1983). Specifically, the existence of opposition parties and a free press under 
democracy constitute a systematic source of political pressure on the regime in power, which 
forces it to address famine conditions. Sen assumes that democracies will have freedom of the 
press (showing how important it is to consider broader concerns than just elections when 
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examining democracy and social outcomes) and that the press would bring information about 
ongoing famine to public attention. Opposition parties likewise have an incentive to publicize 
famine as a way to criticize the party or parties in power. Sen points out that the rulers never 
starve in a famine, and argues that “(d)emocracy…would spread the penalty of famine to the 
ruling groups and the political leadership” (Sen 1996, 24). This is a statement about the power of 
focusing events, like severe famine, to shift attention within a political system. But what about 
the case of chronic food insecurity?  
 Chronic food insecurity is not the same as famine. Chronic food insecurity has a more 
complex set of causes, and therefore, problem definition is much less clear. Likewise, the 
solutions to it are numerous. Whereas democracy may be protective against famine, it may not 
be so automatically advantageous for other types of social problems: “Democracies have been 
particularly successful in preventing disasters that are easy to understand, in which sympathy can 
take an especially immediate form….While the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize, these 
other deprivations call for a deeper analysis” (Sen 1996, 26). He argues this weakness of 
democracy is particularly problematic when a problem disproportionately affects minority 
groups within the society: the extent to which such a problem will be politicized will depend on 
how sympathetic the minority group is in the eyes of the majority. Finally, Sen emphasizes that 
political rights are central to the formulation of needs in the first place. If there are no political 
rights, then some conditions will simply remain in the background, not defined as political 
problems, but rather as personal failings or just natural inevitabilities. 
 If democracies are more responsive to food insecurity than non-democracies, this must 
be in part because politicians in democracies feel electoral pressure to adopt policies to increase 
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food security. It follows that the motivation to address food insecurity will be a function of 
election cycles – when elections are imminent, politicians should be especially attuned to food 
insecurity among potential voters. The Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index, a project that 
investigates political commitment to hunger reduction and nutrition enhancement, provides 
evidence that this may be true (te Lintelo et al. 2014; te Lintelo and Lakshman 2015). Expert 
interviews were used to assess political commitment to food and nutrition security in six 
countries: Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania, and Zambia. Experts were asked the 
question: “How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and malnutrition to 
electoral cycles?” (te Lintelo et al. 2014, 105). In three of the six countries this electoral sensitivity 
was characterized as strong or very strong, in one it was fairly strong, and in two it was 
moderate.7 Strikingly, in five out of six countries, the expert panels judged government 
expenditures on hunger to be more sensitive to electoral cycles than to emergencies and 
disasters – in some cases dramatically so. This finding supports the proposition that elections 
cause politicians to pay attention to food insecurity, while leaving open the question of whether 
the attention is sustained or intermittent. 
Turning back to the quantitative empirical literature, two recent studies have used food 
security measures as the dependent variable in empirical tests of the relationship between 
democracy and social welfare (Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009). 
Pribble et al (2009) examine poverty in 18 Latin American countries from 1968 to 2001; their 
                                                          
7 The authors differentiate between hunger and undernutrition (te Lintelo et al. 2014, 9) and report expert responses 
for both. Part of their project is an effort to determine whether political commitment is different along these 
dimensions. I report their findings for what they term ‘hunger’ because it most closely aligns with the definition of 
food insecurity used in this dissertation.  
55 
 
poverty measure is based on the percentage of households that have enough resources 
(monetary and nonmonetary) to satisfy their basic nutrition requirement (CEPAL/ECLAC 2002, 
39, Box 1.1). Blaydes and Kayser (2011) study available calories per capita (which they term 
calorie consumption). Both papers found that democracy had a positive effect on their respective 
dependent variables, as compared with authoritarian systems. 
Democracy and Social Welfare: The Missing Data Problem. An important paper by Ross (2006) 
addressed two separate issues: first, it examined prior work on democracy and social welfare and 
identified an important source of bias present in most studies; and second, it presented a new 
analysis of democracy and its relationship to infant and child mortality. Infant mortality is strongly 
related to food security – so much so that it is included in the Food Security Index that I will use 
as my dependent variable in the next chapter. Democracies spend more on social welfare than 
authoritarian systems, but it does not follow that social outcomes will be pro-poor. The 
distribution of such spending is an important consideration, because if it accrues to those with 
middle and upper incomes – in which case government spending would simply displace the 
spending such groups would have the means to do anyway – then increased social spending will 
not translate to better outcomes for all social strata. This is why it is important to broaden the 
study of democracy and social welfare to include outcomes, rather than using proxy measures 
that may not tell the whole story. 
 The second concern Ross raises is methodological – and devastating for prior studies that 
purport to show empirical links between democracy and good social welfare outcomes. Most of 
these studies use listwise deletion to deal with missing data.8 This practice is not a problem if the 
                                                          
8 For exceptions see Stasavage (2005) and Harding and Stasavage (2014). 
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data are missing completely at random (MCAR) – in MCAR cases, the data that are missing have 
no relationship with any variables in the dataset as a whole, and therefore no relationship with 
the other variables in the model. The randomness of the MCAR missing data protects against 
sample bias in the results. However, Ross analyzes datasets from prior studies and finds that the 
data are not missing completely at random. In fact, there is a pattern to the missingness. 
Democracies that are low-income tend to be the recipients of foreign aid and loans from 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Aid from such institutions 
comes with stipulations for data generation (to check on effectiveness of programs funded by 
the aid) and with capacity building funds for data collection. Authoritarian countries are less likely 
to get such aid and therefore less likely to produce data on social welfare outcomes. This adds 
up to a devastating pattern of missingness in the resulting datasets – low-income democracies 
have complete data and are therefore included in analyses, while high-performing authoritarian 
countries are dropped because their data is incomplete (Ross 2006, 863). Regime type is the 
explanatory variable in studies of democracy and social welfare, and the missingness in the data 
is directly related to it. Ross presents empirical support for many of the steps in this argument. 
Ross argues that the pattern of missingness leads to sample bias and skewed results. 
Specifically, it makes the relationship between democracy and social welfare outcomes appear 
much stronger and more positive than it actually is. Ross tests the effect of regime type on infant 
and child mortality on a dataset of all 168 states with more than 200,000 population that were 
sovereign from 1970 to 2000 (Ross 2006, 865). When testing for the effect on a dataset that used 
listwise deletion to address missing data, democracy is a significant predictor of infant and child 
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mortality. However, when Ross re-estimated the model after using multiple imputation to 
mitigate the effect of the missingness, democracy was no longer significant. 
Lessons from the Literature. Three lessons stand out from this review: 
1) It is crucial to use measures for social welfare that capture the phenomenon in question 
instead of proxies like social spending, even if the proxies are more easily measurable and 
the data is more available. This project operationalizes social welfare as food security, 
arguably the foundation on which all other types of social welfare are built. Instead of 
measuring food security in terms of spending, calorie availability (Blaydes and Kayser 
2011), or in terms of household or individual resources (Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 
2009), food security will be measured using an index that captures more information 
about the manifestation of food insecurity in each country by including a measure that 
captures food supply (availability) to calculate percent undernourished as well as two 
measurable outcomes that depend heavily on food security: child mortality under five 
years of age and child underweight under five years of age (Wiesmann 2002). This index 
incorporates measures of all dimensions of food insecurity, enhancing its content validity. 
2) Many of the cited studies have a limited geographical scope. This limits the 
generalizability of their findings. If democracy truly enhances food security, this should 
be evident across both time and geographical space. Rather than test this relationship in 
a particular region, my analysis includes all countries over 200,000 in population from 
1990 to 2011. 
3) It is vital to address the missing data problem before performing data analysis of 
international datasets dealing with regime type in order to prevent sample bias. 
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Therefore, I will use multiple imputation to impute the missing values and present results 
on two datasets: one using listwise deletion and the other using multiple imputation. 
In conclusion, this literature review shows that the question of democracy’s effect on social 
welfare is still open. While it has been tested in a variety of contexts, methodological problems 
raise questions as to the legitimacy of positive findings. My analysis will attempt to learn from 
the experience of these other scholars and apply the lessons learned in a new context. 
Decentralization and Social Welfare 
Decentralization is an increasingly common policy prescription, especially in developing 
countries (Ali Khan 2013; Von Braun and Grote 2000). The relationship between decentralization 
and various social outcomes has been studied extensively using case studies (Crawford 2008; 
Crook 2003; Jütting et al. 2005; Steiner 2007; Uchimara and Jütting 2009), and occasionally in 
more quantitative designs within a case study context (Faguet 2004; Faguet and Sánchez 2008). 
One challenge when surveying this literature is the sheer number of different ways 
decentralization is defined and operationalized. 
 Almost all studies of decentralization share a common basis in dividing the concept along 
three dimensions. Firstly, who controls public monetary resources? The answer to this question 
places a country on a spectrum of fiscal decentralization. For example, if funding flows from the 
national level to the subnational governmental units and the subunits lack the power to raise 
their own funds, the country would be fiscally centralized; if the subunits are fiscally independent 
of the national level, the country would be fiscally decentralized. Secondly, who decides what 
policies to pursue and who implements these policies? The answer to this question places a 
country on a spectrum of administrative decentralization. For example, if subunits can adopt and 
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implement policy independent of national government influence or control, the country would 
be administratively decentralized. Thirdly, who controls representation, and thereby, 
participation? The answer to this question places a country on a spectrum of political 
decentralization. Often the differences between studies lie in how these different dimensions are 
measured, but the underlying distinctions remain in place. 
 A common theme in the literature is that poorly designed or incompletely implemented 
decentralization, on any dimension, is unlikely to produce positive effects on social welfare. 
Crook (2003) reviewed political and administrative decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa and 
found that weak accountability mechanisms combined with local politics that favored elite 
interests impeded pro-poor policy outcomes. Crawford (2008) examined political 
decentralization in Ghana, which took place when the central government instituted district 
assemblies, and found no effect on poverty reduction. This was ascribed to constraints left in 
place by the central government that limited local autonomy, calling into question whether 
political decentralization can be effectively implemented from the top down.  
Decentralization success stories include countries where implementation was more 
complete or well-designed. A quantitative study in Bolivia, where extensive fiscal, administrative, 
and political decentralization occurred in 1994, found that it had a substantive and positive effect 
on the pattern and quality of human capital formation and social service provision, and that these 
changes reflected the preferences of the poorest municipalities (Faguet 2004). A further study 
compared Colombia to Bolivia and tested the effect of decentralization on public education 
outcomes. In Colombia, the decentralization was fiscal, and enrollment rates increased. In 
Bolivia, the decentralization was more comprehensive, and again had the effect of directing 
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spending to address social needs, driven by the preferences of the newly empowered rural and 
poorest communities (Faguet and Sánchez 2008). 
Quantitative Measures of Decentralization. Schneider (2003a, 2003b) developed quantitative 
measures of decentralization using factor analysis. His analysis differentiates between types of 
decentralization along the usual three dimensions, and measures these dimensions with multiple 
indicators, most from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) along with other sources 
(Schneider 2003a, 41). Fiscal decentralization is measured by subnational expenditures and 
revenues as percentages of their respective totals. Administrative decentralization is measured 
by taxation and transfers as a percentage of subnational grants and revenues. Political 
decentralization is measured as the presence of municipal and/or subunit (state) elections. These 
indicators were used in a factor analysis that scored each country where data was available from 
zero (pure centralization) to one (pure decentralization) on three dimensions.  
Using these factor scores, Schneider (2003b) examined the effect of different types of 
centralization on tax capacity and pro-poor expenditures. Fiscal decentralization had no effect 
on either. Political centralization had a positive effect on both tax capacity and pro-poor 
expenditure. Administrative decentralization had a positive effect on pro-poor expenditures but 
no effect on tax capacity. Von Braun and Grote (2000) use the same categories and definitions, 
but their indicators vary from Schneider’s. Political decentralization is the same – the presence 
of elections at different levels of government. Fiscal decentralization is similar; Von Braun and 
Grote use the share of subunit expenditure in total country-wide expenditures. Administrative 
decentralization is measured completely differently; they use the amount of subdivision within 
the country (when available) and the population size (in multivariate analysis) to signify this type 
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of decentralization (Von Braun and Grote 2000, 4). They found in a cross-sectional analysis limited 
by data availability that 1) fiscal decentralization reduced poverty (measured with the Human 
Development Index) with declining marginal effect; 2) small-population countries (which are 
deemed to be more administratively centralized) have lower poverty than large ones; and, 3) 
elections at the national level only do not make a difference in poverty over having no elections 
at all, but state-level and, even more so, municipal-level elections had a positive effect on poverty 
reduction – i.e. political decentralization has a positive effect on reducing poverty (Von Braun 
and Grote 2000, 25). 
Conclusion. The literature on decentralization and social welfare is methodologically diverse. The 
findings in the literature are mixed, but it is difficult to draw solid conclusions given the variety 
of definitions and measurements employed in these studies. Qualitative studies have often found 
that the promises and actual outcomes of decentralization do not match up. This is frequently 
due to incomplete implementation or poor design when countries decentralize. This supports the 
choice in this dissertation to focus on measures that capture decentralization quantitatively. 
These measures can capture whether decentralization has actually occurred in practice. The 
potential exception is political decentralization, since the mere presence of elections at 
subnational levels may not necessarily mean that those elections are competitive or effective in 
implementing truly representative or responsive government at the subnational level. 
Federalism and Social Welfare 
The effect of federalism on public policy is a subject of ongoing debate. Pierson (1995) 
posits three categories of institutional effects that follow from federal arrangements. Firstly, 
federalism changes the strategies, preferences, and influence of existing political actors and 
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groups. Secondly, federalism empowers new political actors, namely the subnational 
governmental units. Thirdly, typical problems and strategies arise when public policy-making 
authority and responsibility are shared among actors, as they are under federalism. Each of these 
characteristics of federal systems have implications for social policy-making and, ultimately, 
social policy outcomes. Whereas all political systems ask and answer the question of what 
policies should be adopted and implemented, federal systems add the questions of who should 
decide policies and who should implement them to the mix. 
 Federalism changes the incentive structure for existing political actors, which affects the 
strategies they adopt and the influence they can exert. Most of the differences under federalism 
can be expected to have negative consequences for social policies that require redistribution. 
Federalism divides a country into a patchwork of political jurisdictions, and the economic markets 
that underlie these jurisdictions are rarely contiguous with them. This arrangement can produce 
a situation called competitive deregulation. Since capital is mobile, its power is enhanced under 
federalism because it can choose to exit a political jurisdiction at any time. Any jurisdiction that 
wants to implement generous social policies risks the possibility that businesses who are opposed 
to such redistribution will move to another location, which causes inter-jurisdictional 
competition to minimize both regulation and social spending (hence the argument that only the 
national level of government should attempt redistribution, leaving the sole objective of 
jurisdictions like cities to be economic development (Peterson 1981)). Therefore, social programs 
can be expected to be less generous and less widespread in federal systems. 
Another difference under federalism is that representation is organized along geographic 
lines. This provides the opportunity for geographical alliances to emerge among interests that 
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under other circumstances might not cooperate, such as capital and labor in high wage versus 
low wage regions, often precluding class-based national policy (Pierson 1995, 454). Finally, 
federalism complicates the picture of both policy adoption and policy implementation, since 
there are many more venues in which these fights can take place, and many more actors 
interested in the outcomes (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). Political actors and groups face a 
greater array of options when trying to achieve their policy goals. They are likely to target specific 
venues or levels of government depending on what they want to achieve (Schattschneider 1975). 
Interest groups and other nongovernmental actors care about which venue adopts and 
administers which policy because different combinations of these can help them achieve specific 
policy content goals. It may be difficult to predict what the effects will be, but it is sure that they 
are different than what would happen in a unitary system. The federal institutional system 
influences both the options and the strategies available to achieve policy goals. 
 In addition to the typical actors and groups that vie for power in most political systems, 
federalism creates an institutionally powerful new set of actors – the geographic subunits 
themselves. Depending on the circumstances, these subunits may compete with, preempt, or 
petition the national government. Pierson discusses several ways the introduction of these 
subunits can influence social policy. First, governments have historically derived legitimacy from 
providing social benefits to their constituents, and this leads to a phenomenon called competitive 
state-building (Pierson 1995, 455). In federal systems, both the national level and the subunit 
level would like to take this legitimacy for themselves. Therefore, any decision as to what social 
programs to provide becomes only part of a more contentious debate over who should provide 
them – that is, over jurisdiction. The governments themselves care about policy control 
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regardless of content, since that control will allow them to claim credit or assign blame for social 
outcomes.  
A second and related phenomenon under federalism is policy preemption. Policies are 
often pursued at the subunit level and they preempt possibly more sweeping policy changes at 
the national level. In other cases, subunits resist policy change at the national level if they have 
more comprehensive policies in place already. Either way, the fact that either level may make 
policy can limit the policy options that are enacted. Thirdly, policy diffusion may occur, wherein 
policies enacted in one subunit are adopted by other subunits or expanded to national policies. 
Fourthly, self-sorting by people looking to satisfy their preferences for tax and service packages 
(Tiebout 1956) may limit the social programs adopted. Especially in contexts of extreme 
fragmentation at levels of government below state or province, the fact that those with resources 
can choose to live separately from those without can limit the policies enacted.  
These last three possible effects could conceivably result in better or more social policies 
enacted, but given the fact that businesses and wealthy people can move out of generous 
jurisdictions to ones that have less-generous policies, and therefore perhaps a lower tax burden, 
means that in practice federalism is a hindrance to redistribution. A race to the bottom is a more 
likely result.  
 Finally, according to Pierson, federalism introduces a number of problems inherent in 
shared policymaking. Firstly, since policy adoption in federalism often involves forming broad but 
shallow coalitions, and so many players hold a veto, the resulting policy will usually play to the 
lowest common denominator. Secondly, the complexities involved in implementing policy across 
levels of government will often result in jurisdictional guarantees and protections being a primary 
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goal in policy design, to the detriment of rational or efficient policy. Thirdly, policy options that 
limit the need for joint decision making often seem the best under federalism, because the goal 
becomes avoiding the vicissitudes of the process rather than enacting the best policy option from 
a rationality or efficiency point of view. 
 Rodden (2010) argues that in democracies with right-skewed income distributions, the 
natural tendency is towards redistribution from the rich to the poor. In theory, federalism 
prevents redistribution, while in practice some federations have progressive intergovernmental 
and interpersonal transfers while others do not. This supports Pierson’s contention that 
federalism may not by itself be a causal factor. 
Conclusion. Federalism does not ease the path to redistribution, and at best complicates the 
situation. This may have an effect on redistributive policies like those that alleviate food security. 
The fact that federalism restricts redistributive policy choices, even in situations of political 
decentralization, may lead to lower food security than would occur under a unitary system. 
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CHAPTER 4 DEMOCRACY, DECENTRALIZATION, AND FEDERALISM: DO THEY 
DETERMINE FOOD SECURITY? 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the data analysis in three sections. The first sections presents the 
analysis of democracy and food security. The following two sections cover different measures of 
decentralization. All models contain a measure of federalism. In all cases where variables were 
significant, the effects were in the expected direction. The findings are mixed: some variables 
that were expected to be significant predictors of food security were not significant. Civil liberties 
protections and rule of law are consistently strong positive predictors of food security. Political 
rights were positively associated with food security in one model. When measured by factor 
scores, administrative and fiscal decentralization were found to have the strongest positive effect 
on food security, whereas political decentralization was not statistically significant. However, 
when measured directly using IMF government finance statistics, neither administrative nor fiscal 
decentralization had a statistically significant effect on food security. This may be due to 
imprecision in how well the underlying concepts are captured by the measure in question. 
Federalism had a consistently strong and negative effect when significant, but it is not significant 
in all models. 
The Dataset 
For this dissertation, I constructed a dataset using secondary data from multiple sources 
in order to test hypotheses about the relationship between food security, democracy, federalism, 
and decentralization. The data dictionary containing all of the variables employed in this 
dissertation is presented in Appendix A. See Table 4.1 for the sources of data.  
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Table 4.1. Sources of Data 
Data Sources 
(Cafiero et al. 2016) 
(Schneider 2003a) 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Rankings 
Freedom House Political Rights Rankings 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
International Monetary Fund Government Finance Statistics 
Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2012) 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization Food Security Indicators 
UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank,  
        UN Department of Economic Affairs Population Division) 
World Bank Database of Political Institutions 
 
The dataset contains observations for 229 sovereign countries from 1990 to 2011. The total 
number of observations is 5308. The complete dataset contains more than one hundred variables 
comprising measures of food security, economy, regime type, and other political variables. Given 
the sources and subject matter, there is a substantial amount of missing data, and as such, the 
complete dataset is not used for any of the models presented. Rather, the relevant subset of data 
is analyzed for each model. The variable definitions, sources, and years of coverage for each 
model are presented in the sections below. 
The Dependent Variable: The Food Security Index 
To recap the lengthy discussion in Chapter 2, food security is a complex concept with 
three main dimensions: availability, accessibility, and utilization. Firstly, in order for food security 
to exist, there must be an adequate food supply to meet the energy and nutrient needs of the 
entire population – this is the availability dimension. Food availability is necessary but not 
sufficient for food security, however. Secondly, the food that is available must be accessible to 
the population – if any subset of the population cannot access enough food, then food security 
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will decrease even if there is an adequate food supply. Finally, the utilization dimension captures 
how well the population makes use of the food that they can access. Are they eating enough 
calories and getting enough nutrients to prevent undernourishment (lack of dietary energy) and 
undernutrition (lack of dietary nutrients)? If not, then there will be food insecurity on the 
utilization dimension even if there is enough food available and accessible.  
 Food security, comprising these interrelated dimensions, is particularly well-suited to 
measurement by an index, which is a composite measure that combines information from 
multiple indicators into one, easily interpretable number. The Food Security Index (FSI) – which 
is the Global Hunger Index (IFPRI 2012; Wiesmann 2002) with the scale reversed – will be the 
dependent variable in each model presented in this chapter. The FSI is an additive index that 
contains three equally weighted dimensions, presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Food Security Index: Components  
Indicator Weight Dimension 
Prevalence of Undernourishment (%) 1/3 Availability, 
Accessibility 
% of children under 5 who are underweight 1/3 Utilization 
(Undernourishment) 
% mortality in children under 5 1/3 Utilization 
(Undernourishment, 
Undernutrition) 
Source: (IFPRI 2012; Wiesmann 2002) 
 
Prevalence of undernourishment is the probability (expressed as a percentage) that a randomly 
selected person from the population will lack sufficient calories to lead a sedentary life. It is 
calculated using measures of food supply, inequality in access to food, and country-specific per 
capita calorie minimum thresholds. Therefore, it measures aspects of both the availability and 
accessibility dimensions of food security. Underweight in children under five years of age is a 
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measure of the percentage of children under five who fall two or more standard deviations below 
the mean of weight for age. Underweight is considered to be a measure of undernourishment, 
because underweight is caused by a lack of sufficient calories. It measures the utilization 
dimension of food security – it captures no direct information about whether food is available or 
accessible, but rather the percentage of children under five have been unable to utilize sufficient 
food. Mortality in children under five years of age is the last measure, and it is also a measure of 
utilization. However, it captures information about both undernourishment and undernutrition, 
since both a lack of calories and a lack of sufficient macro- and micronutrients contribute to 
mortality in this age group. 
To calculate the Food Security Index, each indicator is weighted by a third and summed 
together, and then the sum is subtracted from 100: 
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 100 − [(
1
3
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (%)) + 
(
1
3
∗ % 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 5 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) + 
(
1
3
∗ % 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 5)]  
The resulting FSI is scaled from zero to 100 where zero indicates total food insecurity and 100 
indicates total food security, although neither extreme is found in practice. It is measured in 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011. 
Food Security and Democracy 
This section presents models that test the theoretical relationship between food security 
and democracy. Democracy is not treated as a monolithic concept; rather, I use measures 
(discussed below) that attempt to capture two separate dimensions of democracy: political rights 
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and institutions (the degree to which the institutions in a country are democratic); and civil 
liberties and rule of law (the degree to which fundamental rights are protected and the rule of 
law holds).  
Hypotheses. The hypotheses tested by these models are as follows: 
 H1: Countries with more political rights will have higher food security. 
 H2: Countries with more civil liberties will have higher food security. 
Democracy Measure. The two dimensions of democracy are measured using the Freedom House 
scales of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2014a). Freedom House produces 
annual measures for almost all countries in the world. The Freedom House rankings have two 
main categories: political rights, and civil liberties (Freedom House 2014b). The political rights 
rating is based on the freeness and fairness of electoral processes, amount and quality of political 
pluralism and participation, and quality of government in terms of corruption, transparency, and 
effectiveness. The civil liberties rating is based on the degree to which freedom of expression and 
belief are protected, the extent of rights of association and organization, the presence and 
strength of the rule of law, and the extent of personal autonomy and individual rights in each 
country during each measurement year. Both of these groupings represent important – and 
different – dimensions of democracy. The ratings are based on in-house analysis of “a broad 
range of sources, including news articles, academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental 
organizations, and individual professional contacts,” along with consulting external experts in 
academia and the larger human rights community; these analyses are applied to answer 
questions that score each country on ten indicators of political rights and fifteen indicators of 
civil liberties, which are then combined into the two scales (Freedom House 2014b). 
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  Each scale, as employed in this dissertation, runs from one to seven where one is the 
lowest and seven is the highest degree of freedom9. Freedom House uses the terminology of 
freedom instead of democracy, and I will occasionally adopt it here to keep clarity between my 
measurements and sources. In regression analyses using ordinal variables such as this one, 
variables with seven steps or more are often employed as if they are continuous. However, in 
order for that to be a reasonable choice, one would have to argue convincingly that the increase 
from one to two on one of the scales is equivalent to a movement from two to three, four to five, 
or any other increase of one. In addition, treating these scales as continuous overlooks the fact 
that the lines between number ratings are not so bright and obvious as the numbers placed on 
them would suggest. In order to acknowledge the categorical nature of these measures, I will 
employ them in my models having collapsed the one-to-seven scales into three categories. For 
both the political rights and civil liberties scales, I classified countries rated one or two as not 
free; three to five as partly free; and six or seven as free. I then created dummy variables for each 
of the six categories, with a one if the country fell in that category for a particular year, and a 
zero otherwise.  
 Countries that score a one or two on the Freedom House Civil Liberties scale (those I have 
categorized as not free) have very few or no civil liberties protections, and do not have due 
process. Scores of three to five (categorized as partly free) represent countries that have either 
moderate civil liberties protections, or a mixture of strong and weak civil liberties protections. 
Scores of six or seven (categorized as free) are given to countries that have a wide range of civil 
                                                          
9 Freedom House publications use a scale of 7 = least free to 1 = most free. This dissertation follows the common 
convention of reversing the scale from 1 = least free to 7 = most free, in order to facilitate interpretation. An increase 
in the rating then represents more political rights or more civil liberties. 
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liberties protections, freedom from discrimination (in most cases), due process and the rule of 
law. Countries that score a one or two (categorized as not free) on the Freedom House Political 
Rights scale have restricted political rights, limited political parties (sometimes only one), and 
may be autocratic or under military rule. Scores of three to five (categorized as partly free) are 
given to countries that have moderate protections for political rights, or a mixture of strong and 
weak protections. Scores of six or seven (categorized as free) represent countries that have free 
and fair elections, effective government, competitive parties, and incorporate minority interests 
(to a different extent across the two scores). 
For each rating, I chose to use ‘not free’ as my base category, and consequently the 
models include only the part free and free categorical variables. The coefficients on those 
variables will represent the change expected when moving from not free to either part free or 
free along the respective dimension. 
Independent Variable Lags. As democracy increases, food security is expected to increase. 
However, the time frame for this increase is not clear. There are three reasons to lag the 
dependent variable in these models. First, when making a theoretically (if not methodologically) 
causal claim, the cause must precede the effect. Secondly, while the percent underweight and 
percent mortality measures in the FSI are measured yearly, the prevalence of undernutrition is a 
three-year average. To include this measure in models with independent variables within one 
year of the FSI would essentially mean that the independent variables and some portion of the 
dependent variable are contemporaneous, thus leaving any causal argument on shaky ground. 
Third, the complexity of the political systems in question make it unlikely that a movement 
73 
 
towards democracy will immediately effect policy change. In addition, any policy change made 
at the national level will take time to have an effect on the ground.  
 We are left with a quandary: while we can say easily that a one-year lag is too short, due 
to the nature of the FSI components, what is the optimal lag? Even if optimal lags could be 
presumed for one component of the FSI, there is no guarantee that a change in democracy will 
affect child underweight, child mortality, and prevalence of undernutrition at the same rate. 
Choosing a single length for lagging the independent variables may miss important variation. 
Therefore, the methodological step I have taken is to estimate three sets of models, with three-
year, four-year, and five-year lagged independent variables. 
Multiple Imputation. Following the advice of Ross (2006), all the models presented in this section 
are estimated using datasets that have been multiply imputed to correct for bias due to possibly 
nonrandom patterns of missingness. Ross used infant mortality as a dependent variable, and 
infant mortality (like child mortality) has almost complete data for almost all country years. 
Unfortunately, missingness in my data occurred on the dependent variable – some countries had 
no FSI measurement for any year in the dataset, so those countries could not be included in the 
imputed dataset. However, the percentages of countries that scored not free on the civil liberties 
scale in the imputed dataset (19%) and in the complete dataset of all country years (17.62%) 
were not significantly different (z = .1878, two-tailed p = .8510). Likewise, the percentages of 
countries that scored not free on the political rights scale in the imputed dataset (33%) and in 
the complete dataset of all country years (30.59%) were not significantly different from one 
another (z = -.2073, two-tailed p = .8358). This supports an argument that my imputed dataset, 
even with a number of countries dropped, still has retained a significant percentage of countries 
74 
 
that score low on these scales – supporting an argument that the imputed dataset still contains 
a good number of authoritarian countries. The Global Hunger Index, on which the Food Security 
Index is based, is not available for all country years, but rather is published in 5 year increments. 
These are more reasonable increments to capture the quantities contained in the FSI, since 
prevalence of undernutrition is published as 3 year averages. The Food Security Index has values 
for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011 in 118 countries. 
 I used Amelia II (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) to perform all multiple imputation in 
this project. Amelia II allows the user to specify the time-series cross-sectional structure of the 
dataset, in this case being made up of 118 separate countries with 4 observations per country. It 
produces a default of five complete imputed datasets, a number that is considered sufficient in 
most cases. For the three-year and four-year lagged independent variables, I used the default of 
five; for the five-year lagged independent variables, there was proportionally more missing data, 
so I instructed Amelia II to create ten imputed datasets. I used the multiple imputation utilities 
in Stata 14 to import and manipulate the imputed datasets. Stata 14 allows the user to define 
estimation procedures in the context of multiple imputation, so that when model parameters are 
estimated, the degree of uncertainty in the multiply imputed datasets is taken into account when 
computing standard errors and thus significance levels. Essentially, multiple imputation corrects 
the variance-covariance matrix to remove the bias that would have been present had it been 
calculated on data using listwise deletion. While none of the significance levels changed for any 
of my models when run on the imputed versus nonimputed datasets, some of the coefficients 
and standard errors did change in magnitude. Given the consistency of the results between the 
imputed and nonimputed data, I present only the models estimated on the imputed dataset. 
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 Each set of lagged independent variables had a different degree of missingness. For the 
dataset with three-year lagged independent variables, 2.966% of the observations would have 
been dropped using listwise deletion to deal with missing values. 2.75% of the observations in 
the four-year lagged models would have been dropped using listwise deletion. 5.93% of the 
observations in the five-year lagged models would have been dropped without the use of 
multiple imputation. Using multiple imputation obviated the need to use listwise deletion to drop 
any country with a FSI value that also had missing data in other variables. 
 Variables and Measures. The models presented here include the democracy measures outlined 
above, the usual categorical variable for federalism, and two controls. The first is the natural log 
of GDP per Capita, which I employ as a measure of economic development. The second control 
variable is a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa, which is one if a country is in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Descriptive statistics for the datasets are presented in Table 4.3. These are calculated on 
the imputed datasets, so standard errors are provided that take into account the uncertainty 
across imputations. Table B.1 in Appendix B presents the list of countries that are included in the 
models reported in this section. 
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Food Security and Democracy Models (Multiple 
Imputation). 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Error    
 
Food Security 
Index 
86.476 .4559     
 3 year lag 4 year lag 5 year lag 
 Mean 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Civil Liberties: 
Part Free 
.6631 .02184 .6754 .02160 .6419 .02244 
Civil Liberties: 
Free 
.1483 .01646 .1364 .01604 .1536 .01717 
Political Rights: 
Part Free 
.4174 .02278 .4013 .02297 .3877 .02305 
Political Rights: 
Free 
.2508 .02002 .2614 .02035 .2551 .02050 
GDP per capita 
(ln) 
7.05612 .05504 7.02089 .05369 6.9619 .05340 
Federalism .1081 .01430 .1081 .01430 .1059 .01418 
sub-Saharan 
Africa (1=Yes) 
.3559 .02206 .3559 .02206 .3559 .02206 
 
The Models. The initial estimations of all models included all four democracy measures in each 
model. None of them were statistically significant. The bivariate correlations among the 
measures suggest that they may be highly collinear – that is, a country that scores as part free on 
the civil liberties scale is likely to be in the same category on the political rights scale. To separate 
the effects of the two dimensions of democracy, I estimated models separately, one set with the 
civil liberties dummies and one set with the political rights dummies. Interestingly, the effect sizes 
were consistent across the models that included all four dummy variables and those that included 
only two – only the standard errors changed significantly. This supports the argument that 
multicollinearity was inducing too much uncertainty for the variables to appear significant, while 
leaving the coefficients themselves unbiased.  
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The models are estimated in Stata 14 using linear regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors. Each model exhibited first order autocorrelation, which was addressed by 
specifying that the correlation type was AR1. This results in Stata using Prais-Winsten regression 
for the coefficients. Table 4.4 gives the regression results. The significance level used in these 
models is alpha = .05. 
Table 4.4. Estimates for Models with Freedom House Democracy Measures, DV = FSI in 4 
panels (1995, 2000, 2005, 2011) 
 3 year lag 4 year lag 5 year lag 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
GDP per capita 
(ln) 
4.07760* 
(.8051) 
4.09826* 
(.8237) 
3.9587* 
(.8385) 
4.0040* 
(.8551) 
3.8413* 
(.8209) 
3.8556* 
(.8519) 
Federalism -1.3139* 
(.5558) 
-1.3903* 
(.5712) 
-1.1716 
(.6650) 
-1.4304* 
(.6504) 
-1.04959 
(.7303) 
-1.0891 
(.8157) 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
-7.5808* 
(1.1499) 
-7.4126* 
(1.09215) 
-7.7530* 
(1.1105) 
-7.5644* 
(1.04759) 
-7.9325* 
(1.09355) 
-7.8544* 
(1.08751) 
Civil Liberties: 
Part free 
1.3982* 
(.6090) 
 1.2354 
(.7354) 
 1.1205* 
(.5505) 
 
Civil Liberties: 
Free 
1.6899* 
(.8030) 
 1.8537* 
(.8308) 
 1.8276* 
(.7568) 
 
Political 
Rights: 
Part Free 
 .7787 
(.6307) 
 1.2985 
(.7518) 
 .4424 
(.5046) 
Political 
Rights: Free 
 1.1197 
(.6785) 
 1.4458* 
(.7015) 
 1.0002 
(.5581) 
Constant 59.1128* 
(5.8384) 
59.4897* 
(5.9422) 
60.2274* 
(6.3502) 
60.07626* 
(6.3769) 
61.4634* 
(6.2910) 
61.9209* 
(6.3383) 
Regression Statistics      
n 472 472 472 472 472 472 
Number of 
Countries 
118 118 118 118 118 118 
F 21.18* 23.04* 22.72* 28.25* 19.76* 21.05* 
p-value of F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
RMSE 5.6173 5.6201 5.6842 5.6853 5.6601 5.7020 
Number of 
Imputations 
5 5 5 5 10 10 
*p (two-tailed) < .05 
Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficients and the standard error in parentheses. 
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Findings. In all models, the natural log of GDP per capita had a strong positive effect on food 
security of approximately four points on the Food Security Index. Contrary to expectations, the 
further the GDP variable is lagged, the lower the effect, although substantively the differences 
between the coefficients are very small – all of them are within 0.2 of each other. Being located 
in sub-Saharan Africa is a strong negative predictor across all models with coefficients between -
7.5 and -8. These increase as the lag increases within model specification – that is, the coefficients 
in the civil liberties models increase as the lag increases, and likewise with those in the political 
rights models.  
 Federalism is significant in three of the six models. It is significant in both models with 
three-year lagged independent variables, and also in the political rights model with four-year 
lagged independent variables. Federalism was not significant in either of the five-year lagged 
models. I expected federalism to negatively affect food security, and that hypothesis is 
supported, and certainly not contradicted. The coefficients are consistent and negative across 
the models where they are significant. They range from -1.4304 to -1.3139, which is in the 
expected direction.  
Across all the models, effect size and direction for federalism is consistent, even when the 
coefficients are not significant. This suggests a fairly robust result. Slightly lower effect sizes 
(reflected in the decreasing coefficients) and slightly more uncertainty (reflected in the increasing 
standard errors) combine to make the coefficients lose significance as the lag increases. This 
suggests that federalism impacts food security more in the short term (within two to three years), 
and that impact is attenuated in the longer term (five years or longer). 
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Models 1, 3, and 5 included dummy variables measuring civil liberties and rule of law: Civil 
Liberties: Part Free; and Civil Liberties: Free. Five out of the six coefficients were statistically 
significant. In the four-year lag model, Civil Liberties: Part Free was not significant (two-tailed p  
= .093). In all instances where the coefficients were significant, the relationship was positive and 
substantive. The root mean square error (RMSE) gives a measure of accuracy for a model: the 
lower the RMSE, the lower the average prediction error when using that model to predict the 
observed data. Therefore, the RMSE can be used to compare models that have the same 
dependent variable measured in the same units. Using the RMSE as my decision criterion, I will 
discuss the three-year lag model (Model 1) in detail, because that model has the lowest root 
mean square error (RMSE = 5.6173). 
As previously discussed, the seven-point Freedom House Civil Liberties scale was 
transformed into three dummy variables: Not Free (1-2); Partly Free (3-5); and, Free (6-7). Civil 
Liberties: Not Free serves as the baseline category; therefore, it was not included in the models. 
The coefficients represent the effect size and direction of being in each category in comparison 
to the baseline. Turning to Model 1, then: holding all other independent variables constant, being 
partly free with respect to civil liberties is associated with a 1.3982 increase in the Food Security 
Index, as compared with being in the not free category. The effect size is larger for the Civil 
Liberties: Free category. Holding all other independent variables constant, a country that is free 
on the civil liberties scale is expected to be 1.6899 points higher on the Food Security Index than 
an equivalent country that is not free on the civil liberties scale.  
Taken together, these two results support H2. To the extent to which these measures 
capture the concept as intended, countries with more civil liberties have higher food security. 
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Civil liberties are a dimension of the expansive definition of democracy employed in this 
dissertation. This model provides strong support that more democracy, in the form of stronger 
civil liberties protections and increased rule of law, is indeed associated with higher food security. 
The only statistically significant coefficient on a Political Rights categorical variable is in 
Model 4, where Political Rights: Free is significant and positive. It is worth noting that this same 
variable is nearly significant in Model 6 – the five-year lag model – with a two-tailed p-value of 
.075, and has a two-tailed p-value of .101 in the three-year lag model. These nearly significant 
results provide reason to think that the significant result in Model 4 is not simply a fluke. Holding 
all other independent variables constant, a country that is free on the political rights scale is 
expected to have a Food Security Index 1.4458 points higher than a country that is not free on 
the political rights scale. When it comes to political rights, it seems that a move from not free to 
partly free does not have a significant effect – only once a country moves to completely free, 
does food security increase. This result supports H1, that more political rights will be associated 
with higher food security. But not just any increase in political rights will do – elections must be 
free and fair, parties must be competitive, government must effectively control its purview, and 
barriers to political participation must be nearly nonexistent before food security will increase. 
Discussion. These results provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2: countries with more 
political rights and more civil liberties, respectively, have more food security. However, the 
results go further than that: there are significant differences between political rights and civil 
liberties in the magnitude, time frame, and consistency of their associations with food security.  
 The magnitude of the increase in food security that follows from an opening in civil 
liberties is largest when moving between the not free and the partly free categories; the increase 
81 
 
in food security that accompanies a move from partly free to free, while still positive, is much 
smaller. Taking the three-year lag model as an example, moving from not free to part free on the 
civil liberties dimension produces an increase in FSI of 1.3982 points. Moving from part free to 
free, however, increases the FSI by only an additional .2917 points. This means that about 83 
percent of the total increase in food security that results from an opening in civil liberties comes 
when the opening is still only partial (not free to partly free). The full transition to free on the civil 
liberties dimension increases food security only another 17 percent. In the five-year lagged 
model, the relative strength remains the same although the magnitude is different: the 
movement from not free to partly free accounts for 61 percent of the increase in food security, 
while the further move to fully free adds another 39 percent. This implies that the initial opening 
from complete repression of civil liberties to even partial protections allows for mobilization 
within society that will push politicians to pay attention to food insecurity and become more 
responsive. This may take different forms in different countries. Freedom of speech or protest in 
one country may bring pressure onto politicians, whereas freedom of the press may be the 
deciding factor in another (Dreze and Sen 1991). Further research could focus on a typology of 
civil liberties as the independent variable, which could illuminate which ones are most effective 
at increasing social welfare. 
 Political rights, in contrast, are only associated with higher food security if the opening is 
complete. Partial freedom on the political rights dimension is never associated with higher food 
security at any lag. This suggests that the mechanism by which political rights increase food 
security only works if a country’s people enjoy the full measure of political rights. Perhaps it is 
only then that parties and politicians who truly represent the interests of the food insecure can 
82 
 
be elected. This too is a question for further research. Another difference is that political rights 
do not increase food security as much as civil liberties do. Going from not free to free on the civil 
liberties dimension increases FSI by between 1.6899 and 1.8537 points, depending on the lag, 
whereas the same increase on the political rights dimension increases FSI by only 1.4458 points. 
This could mean that the political power afforded to people by the exercise of civil liberties is 
more effective than that exercised at the ballot box. 
 A final intriguing difference between civil liberties and political rights in their effect on 
food security is that civil liberties have a much more consistent effect. Civil liberties were 
associated with more food security at three-year, four-year, and five-year lags. This suggests that 
civil liberties provide a continuous opportunity to mobilize and keep up the pressure on 
government to respond to food insecurity. Political rights were only associated with more food 
security at a four-year lag. Recall that prior research found that budget expenditures on hunger 
were related to electoral cycles in some countries (te Lintelo et al. 2014). Perhaps this could 
explain the intermittent nature of the association between political rights and food security – if 
effective political pressure through voting behavior is tied to election cycles then I would expect 
the effect of political rights on food security would go in cycles as well. It may be fruitful to 
examine whether there is an “election effect” on food security. Future research could include a 
variable that signifies the number of years since the most recent election and see if that is 
negatively related to food security. 
 The analysis presented in this section, based upon the statistical models presented here, 
shows that democracy is an important determinant of food security. Both political rights and civil 
liberties are predictors of food security. However, these two dimensions of democracy support 
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food security in different ways. This suggests that a simplified definition of democracy that 
focuses on elections alone would miss many of the nuances in the relationship between 
democracy and food security. In fact, a procedural measurement of democracy that focuses on 
political institutions might not capture the relationship at all, given that civil liberties comprise 
the most consistent predictor of increased food security. 
Food Security and Decentralization: Model 1: Factor Scores 
The first model examines the relationship between decentralization and food security. It 
tests four hypotheses. Recall from Chapter 3 that decentralization is typically understood to have 
three distinct dimensions. Fiscal decentralization is the degree to which the subnational 
governmental units in a country have control over their own expenditure choices and revenues. 
Administrative decentralization is the extent to which subnational units control policy choice and 
implementation. Political decentralization is the extent to which a country has elections at 
subnational levels of government. Each of the three dimensions can be expected to have an effect 
on food security, independent of the others. Therefore, I will employ one hypothesis for each 
dimension: 
H1: Countries that are fiscally decentralized will have more food security. 
 H2: Countries that are administratively decentralized will have more food security. 
H3: Countries that are politically decentralized will have more food security. 
Formal federalism – that is, federalism that is constitutionally defined – is a different matter than 
decentralization. Constitutionally mandated federalism introduces a number of complications for 
policy makers who wish to adopt and implement redistributive policies like those that address 
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food insecurity. It also provides more points of access for those who wish to block policy. 
Therefore, I propose one hypothesis to test the effect of formal federalism on food security: 
H4: Federations will have less food security. 
These hypotheses are tested using a cross-sectional dataset of 42 countries. The dependent 
variable is measured in the year 2000 and the independent variables are measured in 1996, in 
order to preserve the direction of causation when interpreting the model. 
Variables and Measures. Four explanatory variables are included in this model. The first is 
Federalism, which is a dummy variable that takes a one if a country formally defines itself as a 
federation. While federalism conceptually implies decentralization, in practice a country defined 
as federation can be quite centralized, and federalism itself causes a number of issues that can 
obstruct policy formation, adoption, and implementation, as discussed in the literature review. I 
expect that formal federalism will have a negative relationship with food security.  
Three variables capture aspects of decentralization. Fiscal, administrative, and political 
decentralization are measured as factor scores produced by Schneider (2003a). The three types 
of decentralization are measured by, respectively, subnational expenditures and revenues as 
percentages of their respective totals, taxation and transfers as a percentage of subnational 
grants and revenues, and the presence of municipal and/or subunit (state or provincial) elections 
(Schneider 2003a, 41). These indicators were subjected to a factor analysis that scored each 
country where data was available on three dimensions from zero (completely centralized) to one 
(completely decentralized). Confirmatory factor analysis supported the hypothesis that 
decentralization has three distinct dimensions.  
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Subnational expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures, and 
subnational revenues as a percentage of total government revenues are the indicators for fiscal 
decentralization. Expenditures (cash outlays) and revenues (cash inflows) together measure the 
fiscal impact of subnational governments. Percentage of subnational revenues that come from 
taxes and percentage of subnational revenues that do not come from transfers measure 
administrative decentralization. Schneider argues that these two indicators capture the degree 
to which subnational governments control their own resources, thus are administratively 
separate from the central government. I am not entirely convinced by this argument, as these 
indicators do not seem to capture the implementation and policy control aspects of 
administrative decentralization. Still, the factor analysis Schneider presents clearly shows that 
these two indicators correlate along a different dimension than the fiscal indicators do. The final 
dimension, political decentralization, is measured by the existence of municipal and state or 
provincial elections. These measures straightforwardly capture formal representation at 
subnational levels of government, but neglect to measure the quality of elections or whether 
they result in qualitatively representative and responsive governance at the subnational level. I 
expect each of the three factor scores to be positive predictors of food security. 
 Two control variables are included in this model. The first control is GDP per capita 
measured in 2014 US Dollars. This variable has been transformed by taking the natural log to 
linearize the relationship between FSI and GDP per capita. Food security is expected to increase 
with higher levels of economic development, as captured by GDP per capita. The second control 
variable is a dummy variable for sub-Saharan African. If a country is in sub-Saharan Africa, this 
variable takes a value of one. This variable captures variation that is specific to sub-Saharan 
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Africa, which suffers from a combination of specific factors including poor climate, land 
degradation, and disease burden that cause it to have a higher food insecurity on average. I would 
have preferred to include subregional level fixed effects that would capture unmeasured 
variation across all subregions, but this dataset, in a few pivotal cases (particularly India in South 
Asia), has only one country per subregion – thus conflating subregion-level fixed effects with 
country-level fixed effects and wreaking havoc in the residuals. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 4.5, correlations in Table 4.6, and scatter plots for each combination of 
variables are presented in Figure 4.1. Table B.2 in Appendix B presents the list of countries 
included in the model presented in this section. 
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Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics for Decentralization Model 1 with Factor Scores 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Food Security Index 42 90.3905 6.6528 75.2 98.6 
Federalism (1 = Yes) 42 .1429 .3542 0 1 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
42 .3698 .2267 0 1 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
42 .5731 .2562 0 1 
Political 
Decentralization 
42 .4905 .2962 0 1 
GDP per capita (ln) 42 7.3772 .9214 5.1822 8.9512 
sub-Saharan Africa  
(1 = Yes) 
42 .1429 .3542 0 1 
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Model Equation and Results. The equation to be estimated is: 
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
+ 𝛽5 ∗ ln(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃) +  𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑏-𝑆𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 +  𝜖 
The regression equation was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in Stata 14 
and the results are presented in Table 4.7. The significance level for this model (and indeed all of 
the models presented in this dissertation) is set at α = .05. 
Table 4.7. Decentralization Model 1 Estimates, DV = FSI in 2000  
 Model 1 95% Confidence Interval for β 
Federalism (1 = Yes) -6.4504* 
(2.4156) 
-11.3543 -1.5466 
Fiscal Decentralization 10.7749* 
(3.7677) 
3.1261 18.4237 
Administrative Decentralization 6.9156* 
(2.7002) 
1.4339 12.3974 
Political Decentralization -.7602 
(2.5487) 
-5.9343 4.4139 
GDP per capita (ln) 6.0600* 
(.8801) 
4.2732 7.8467 
sub-Saharan Africa (1 = Yes) -4.4918* 
(1.9643) 
-8.4796 -.5040 
Constant 39.6740* 
(7.2338) 
24.9886 54.3594 
Regression Statistics    
R2 0.6681   
Adjusted R2 0.6112   
RMSE 4.1482   
F 11.74*   
n 42   
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests) 
Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficient and the 
standard error in parentheses. 
  
 
The model explains 66.81% of the variation in the Food Security Index. All of the coefficient 
estimates are significant and in the expected direction except for political decentralization. The 
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F test statistic was significant, showing that the set of all independent variables is jointly related 
to the FSI. The Root Mean Square Error is 4.1482, which means that if this model were used to 
predict the FSI, the average error would be 4.1482. The model is robust to alternative 
specifications, except that when interactions10 between the explanatory variables were included, 
neither the interactions nor the individual variables were significant. This result is likely due to 
the multicollinearity introduced by interactions in a dataset with such a low number of 
observations. The model was subjected to a battery of post-estimation tests which found no 
violations of regression assumptions, multicollinearity, or omitted variable bias. 
 I considered the possibility that Federalism and Political Decentralization were both 
measuring the same concept and that this was leading to the lack of significance for Political 
Decentralization when both variables were included. Different combinations of these two 
variables were tested, including interactions, and the results were robust. Federalism was always 
statistically significant with a negative coefficient and Political Decentralization was never 
significant. This may seem surprising, but it is explicable: the factor analytic nature of the Political 
Decentralization measure means that it does not function as a dummy variable indicator of 
subnational elections. Rather it captures the placement of a country on a zero to one scale of 
political decentralization as measured by the combination of the six indicators that were used to 
calculated the three factor scores (Schneider 2003a). Each of the six indicators partially measure 
                                                          
10 The following interactions were included in alternative specifications, separately and together, in all possible 
combinations: Fiscal Decentralization x Federalism; Administrative Decentralization x Federalism; Political 
Decentralization x Federalism; Fiscal Decentralization x Administrative Decentralization; Fiscal Decentralization x 
Political Decentralization; Administrative Decentralization x Political Decentralization. Federalism retained 
significance in almost all the models, and when it was not significant it was near-significant (p < .10) and the 
coefficient was always large and negative. Any single interaction or combination of interactions immediately caused 
all decentralization variables to lose significance, probably due to multicollinearity between the interactions and the 
constituent variables combined with the relatively small sample size. 
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each of the three dimensions, because “the indicators largely measure one of the dimensions 
and can be clustered according to this principal component, but the effects of other dimensions 
also spill over into each indicator. This spill-over can be explained as the result of the fact that 
the dimensions are related to one another and also because the indicators are only imperfect 
measures of any single dimension” (Schneider 2003a, 47). Fiscal decentralization relates 
moderately to political decentralization in the factor analysis, so a fiscally centralized country will 
score lower on political decentralization even if that country has both state/provincial and local 
elections.    
Findings. Of the first three hypotheses, two are supported – both fiscal decentralization and 
administrative decentralization are statistically significant and positively related to food security. 
See Figure 4.2 for a graphical representation of the expected change in FSI as fiscal and 
administrative decentralization increases. 
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Figure 4.2. Food Security and Two Types of Decentralization 
 
Fiscal decentralization has the strongest positive relationship with the Food Security Index out of 
any of the independent variables. Figure 4.2 shows the relative strength of this relationship 
compared with the relationship between FSI and administrative decentralization; the steeper the 
slope the stronger the predictive relationship. The movement from full fiscal centralization (fiscal 
decentralization = 0) to full fiscal decentralization (fiscal decentralization = 1) is associated with 
an increase of 10.7749 in the FSI, holding all other independent variables constant. Smaller 
increments of fiscal decentralization would also be expected to have a positive effect. For 
example, an increase in fiscal decentralization of 0.25 would be expected to increase FSI by about 
2.7 on average.  
 Administrative decentralization also has a positive relationship with food security, 
although it is not as strong as fiscal decentralization. As a country moves from totally centralized 
administratively (administrative decentralization = 0) to totally centralized (administrative 
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decentralization = 1), the Food Security Index is expected to increase by 6.9156 on average, 
holding all the other independent variables constant. This result supports the second hypothesis: 
administrative decentralization is associated with higher food security. 
 Political decentralization was not a statistically significant predictor of food security, and 
this result was consistent across all plausible alternative model specifications. Therefore, the 
third hypothesis, that political decentralized countries would have higher food security, is not 
supported. This casts doubt on theories that subnational elections, which allow for voting-
enforced accountability, will result in local and state or provincial politicians attending to issues 
like food insecurity. However, as the qualitative studies in the literature review point out, the 
mere existence of subnational elections does not insure that political decentralization has truly 
taken place. It could be that no association is found here because this measurement is unable to 
differentiate between countries that have decentralized in an effective way and those that have 
not.  
Federalism has a strong, negative relationship with the Food Security Index, a result which 
supports the fourth hypothesis. Federations are expected to have an FSI 6.4504 lower on average 
than countries with unitary government systems, holding all other independent variables 
constant.  
The control variables were both significant and their effects were in the expected 
direction. An increase of one in the natural log of GDP per capita is associated with 6.06 expected 
increase in the Food Security Index, holding all other independent variables constant. Sub-
Saharan African countries are expected to have a Food Security Index on average 4.4918 lower 
than countries outside of that region, holding all other variables constant. 
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Discussion. These results support the first two hypotheses: administrative decentralization and 
fiscal decentralization are associated with better food security. Political decentralization, as 
measured by the factor score, does not predict food security; therefore, the third hypothesis in 
not supported by this model. Federalism is a significant negative predictor of food security, which 
supports the fourth hypothesis. Strikingly, these three significant measures individually each 
have greater impact on food security than a one-point increase in the natural log of GDP per 
capita.11 
 Theory predicted that decentralization ought to produce better social outcomes due to 
the efficiency gains from the ability to tailor policies to address local problems and satisfy local 
policy preferences. I argued that decentralization should lead to: better problem definition since 
definitions can be specific to local circumstances; better targeting of policies since local 
information will be the most accurate with respect to identifying those in need; and more 
avenues for political pressure and mobilization, thus increasing responsiveness of government to 
local needs.  
These results show that fiscal decentralization, indeed, is the single most important 
determinant of food security in any of the models presented in this dissertation. Fiscal 
decentralization is operationalized in this model as the degree to which revenues are collected 
and expenditures occur at the subnational level. Administrative decentralization is about two-
thirds as strong in its association with increased food security. Administrative decentralization 
                                                          
11 A one-point increase in the natural log of GDP per capita, when expressed in dollars, represents different 
magnitudes of change at different levels of income. For example, if a country began at $1000 per capita GDP, a one-
point increase in the natural log of GDP per capita would bring that country up to $2725 per capita GDP. A further 
one-point increase in the natural log of GDP per capita would bring that same country up to about $7400 per capita 
GDP. 
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here is operationalized as the degree to which subnational governments control their own 
resources, by measuring the relative percentage of tax as a portion of revenues and the relative 
percentage of revenues that are not transfers from other levels of governments (which often 
come with strings attached that limit local autonomy). These results taken together suggest that 
having sufficient resources under the control of relevant local and subnational decision makers 
is important to produce food security. These decision makers might be elected politicians or 
appointed bureaucrats – the measures do not differentiate between types. It is the local control 
of resources that seems to make the difference.  
If democratically elected local leadership matters for food security, then that should show 
up as a significant coefficient on political decentralization – but political decentralization was not 
significant. I am hesitant to claim that this proves that local or subnational democracy does not 
matter, however. Here, political decentralization was captured by the presence of local and 
subnational elections. Too much of the qualitative literature emphasizes that the presence of 
elections does not guarantee that local elected officials will be independent of central authority 
or be able to exercise effective power. Therefore, this result warrants further investigation. A 
measure that captured more qualitative information about local competitiveness of elections, or 
autonomy on the part of subnational leaders, might shed more light on the matter.  
 In the next section, I test similar hypotheses using alternative measurements of 
decentralization on a time-series cross-sectional dataset.  
Food Security and Decentralization: Model 2: IMF measures 
The second set of models examining the relationship between food security and 
decentralization employ a number of indicators gathered by the International Monetary Fund in 
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the Government Finance Statistics database. These indicators are used to test the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Countries that are fiscally decentralized will have more food security. 
H2: Countries that are administratively decentralized will have more food security. 
The hypotheses are tested using a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset of a maximum of 54 
countries at four time periods. The models are estimated using linear regression with panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) (Beck and Katz 1995). 
Variables and Measures. The Food Security Index (FSI) is the dependent variable, and it is 
measured at four points in time: 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011. The FSI varies both within and 
between the countries across the time periods. This can be seen in the spaghetti plot shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. Spaghetti Plot of the Food Security Index in 54 Countries from 1995 - 2011.
 
 
 
The IMF Government Finance Statistics dataset comprises statistics from IMF member 
countries, although not all countries report data on all measures (Dziobek, Gutierrez Mangas, 
and Kufa 2011). The variables incorporated into my full dataset are from 1990 to 2011, although 
the specific observations used in the models in this section are from 1990 to 2008. The indicators 
considered in these models are presented in Table 4.8.  
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Table 4.8. IMF Decentralization Indicators 
Indicator (Variable Name) 
Variable 
Name 
Dimension of 
Decentralization 
Local Government Expenditures as share 
of Total Government Expenditures (%) 
lclExp Fiscal 
Subnational Government Expenditures 
as a share of Total Government 
Expenditures (%) 
SNExp Fiscal 
Local Government Revenues as a share 
of Total Government Revenues (%) 
lclRev_TG Fiscal 
Subnational Government Revenues as a 
share of Total Government Revenues (%)  
SNRev_TG Fiscal 
Local Government Tax Revenue as a 
share of Total Local Government 
Revenue (%) 
lclTax_Rev Administrative 
 
Subnational Government Tax Revenue as 
a share of Total Subnational 
Government Revenue (%) 
SNTax_Rev Administrative 
 
Local Government Compensation of 
Employees as a share of Total 
Government Compensation of 
Employees (%) 
lclCmpEmp Administrative 
Subnational Government Compensation 
of Employees as a share of Total 
Government Compensation of 
Employees (%) 
SNCmpEmp Administrative 
 
The IMF employs the subnational versions of these indicators as measures of fiscal 
decentralization (Dziobek, Gutierrez Mangas, and Kufa 2011). Following Schneider’s (2003a) 
reasoning, subnational and local expenditures and revenues are clearly measures of fiscal 
decentralization. However, subnational and local tax revenues as shares of their respective 
revenue streams would seem to answer both the question of who controls the money (fiscal 
decentralization) and capture the level of autonomy of who implements and controls policy 
(administrative decentralization). However, collecting more taxes that are kept at and controlled 
by the local or subnational government level certainly implies more control over how that money 
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is spent (therefore implying a higher degree of policy control). Following this reasoning, I classify 
these two indicators as capturing administrative decentralization. The final two indicators are 
local and subnational shares of compensation of employees. As far as these indicators represent 
the share of employees at each governmental level, they most closely approximate 
administrative decentralization. 
The year in which each indicator is measured varies, based on the availability of data. The 
first choice was a four-year lag, to test the same lag that was employed in the factor score model. 
When this year was not available, I first chose a three-year lag, and if data was not available then 
either, a five-year lag. This is a more conservative decisional ordering, since presumably whatever 
effect was seen after four years would be attenuated by using a three-year lag whereas it would 
be strengthened by using a five-year lag. Missingness in this dataset is not expected to have a 
systematic relationship with any of the variables, and so the dataset is used as it is. 
Formal federalism is included as a dummy variable in this model with one for federal and 
zero for not federal. Sub-Saharan Africa and GDP per capita (ln) were once again used as control 
variables. Table 4.9 contains the descriptive statistics for this dataset. Tables B.2, B.3, B.4, and 
B.5 in Appendix B present the countries included in each model presented in this section. 
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Table 4.9. Descriptive Statistics for Decentralization Models with IMF Measures 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FSI 144 91.6854 7.1293 69 99.4 
SNExp 75 21.4455 15.8240 .60862 68.2193 
SNRev_TG 86 22.2022 16.5928 .6473 71.4723 
SNTax_Rev 133 41.7436 23.5918 .9185 100 
SNCmpEmp 80 28.8048 23.0517 .2038 76.4562 
lclExp 75 16.8475 12.7760 .2750 68.2193 
lclRev_TG 88 16.6599 12.8606 .1444 71.4723 
lclTax_Rev 139 41.6049 24.2499 .9185 100 
lclCmpEmp 82 21.7161 20.5230 .2038 75.5697 
GDP per Capita 
(ln) 
144 7.5523 1.0129 4.7792 9.7046 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
144 .1806 .3860 0 1 
Federalism 144 .125 .3319 0 1 
 
Correlations are shown in Table 4.10 for the Subnational government variables, and Table 4.11 
for the Local government variables. 
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The correlation matrices show that there is considerable risk of multicollinearity if all four 
decentralization indicators were to be included in a single model. Subnational revenue as a share 
of total government revenue (SNRev_TG) and subnational expenditures as a share of total 
government expenditures (SNExp) are nearly perfectly correlated12, with a Pearson’s r of .9875. 
Subnational compensation of employees as a share of total government compensation of 
employees (SNCmpEmp) is strongly correlated with subnational expenditures (SNExp) with a 
Pearson’s r of .9085. Subnational compensation of employees (SNCmpEmp) is also strongly 
correlated with subnational government revenues as a share of total government revenues 
(SNRev_TG) with a Pearson’s r of 0.8902. Local government decentralization indicators have the 
same problem.  Local expenditures as a share of total government expenditures (lclExp) and local 
revenues as a share of total government revenues (lclRev_TG) are almost perfectly correlated, 
with a Pearson’s r of .9864. Local expenditures (lclExp) and local compensation of employees as 
a share of total government compensation of employees (lclCmpEmp) are strongly correlated 
(Pearson’s r = .8991). Finally, local revenues (lclRev_TG) are strongly correlated with local 
compensation of employees (lclCmpEmp) with a Pearson’s r of .8726. The only one of the four 
indicators that escapes strong correlations with the others is the share of local or subnational 
revenue that comes from taxes (lclTax_Rev, SNTax_Rev). Due to this complication within the 
data, I will estimate several models that include the three problematic variables paired with 
subnational or local revenues from taxes. 
                                                          
12 Pearson’s r varies from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to 1 (perfect positive correlation). A Pearson’s r of 0 
indicates no correlation between the two variables. 
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Models and Results. The models presented in this section were estimated in Stata 14. The 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation showed that each model exhibited first-order (AR1) 
autocorrelation (Drukker 2003). AR1 correlation means that the errors at time t are correlated 
with the errors in the previous time period. If it is not accounted for, such correlation leads to 
optimistic standard errors and p-values that are too small – causing the conclusion that slope 
coefficients are significant when they really are not. Given that AR1 correlation is present in these 
models, I used the procedure xtpcse with an AR1 correlation structure specified when estimating 
the models, which produces linear estimates using a Prais-Winsten regression with panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs). The results are presented in Table 4.12. This significance level 
for these models is α = .05. 
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Table 4.12. Estimates for IMF Subnational Decentralization Models, DV = FSI in 4 panels 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita (ln) 2.9603* 
(.5967) 
3.1019* 
(.6895) 
2.6349* 
(.4971) 
3.9581* 
(.7833) 
sub-Saharan Africa -5.4574* 
(.5478) 
-4.8465* 
(1.1844) 
-5.3672* 
(1.5859) 
-6.8990* 
(1.4914) 
Federalism .6626 
(.9088) 
.3465 
(.7944) 
1.2350 
(1.8061) 
-3.09682* 
(.8555) 
SNTax_Rev .01346 
(.01612) 
.009036 
(.01399) 
.01698 
(.01884) 
.01761 
(.02093) 
SNExp -.01295 
(.03297) 
   
SNRev_TG  -.004940 
(.02427) 
  
SNCmpEmp   -.008693 
(.01754) 
 
Constant 71.0712* 
(4.9808) 
69.8041* 
(5.6357) 
73.5851* 
(4.4822) 
62.3377* 
(6.9991) 
Regression Statistics 
n 70 81 76 132 
Number of Countries 40 42 39 59 
R2 .9678 .9712 .5152 .9591 
Wald χ2 744.57* 355.64* 54.79* 85.85* 
*p < .05 
Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficients and the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Findings. These results do not support either hypothesis that fiscal or administrative 
decentralization is associated with higher food security.  
Federalism was only significant in Model 4. Note that Model 4 also has the highest 
number of observations and countries. Similar to the result found in the model in the previous 
section, federalism had a negative relationship with the FSI. A federal country is expected to have 
a Food Security Index on average 3.09682 points lower than a non-federal country, holding all 
other independent variables constant. This adds to the evidence that when federalism is 
significant, it is consistently a negative predictor of food security, and substantively quite large. 
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The natural log of GDP per capita and the sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable showed a 
consistently strong relationship with food security. In the case of GDP per capita, that relationship 
is strong and positive across models, whereas a country being located in sub-Saharan Africa is 
consistently associated with lower food security.  
I do not present the results for the local government decentralization measures here, 
because they are commensurate with the results from the subnational decentralization 
measures. I also estimated models for each cross-section, again with no substantively or 
statistically significant results. In short, these models provide no support for the hypotheses that 
differentiate federalism from different dimensions of decentralization.  
Discussion. These models do not support the proposition that administrative or fiscal 
decentralization is related to food security. In the previous section, the cross-sectional model 
showed strong support for these propositions. So what are we to take away from this section? 
There are two ways to view this. First, the results presented in this section may be less reliable 
because direct measures were used instead of being decomposed into factor scores. Factor 
scores methodologically differentiate related measures along underlying dimensions, removing 
the correlations between measures by making them orthogonal to one another. It could be that 
the measures in their original form (not factored) do not capture the underlying dimensions of 
decentralization, or that they conflate concepts (in this case administrative and fiscal 
decentralization), muddying the measures so much as to render them unusable in model 
estimation. This would imply that the lack of results is due to measurement error, and we should 
rely on the results from the factor score model. On the other hand, the factor score model was 
based on a limited sample of countries (determined by data availability), and was cross-sectional. 
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It could be that the results that were found were an artifact of either the sample or the time 
period that was used. The only conclusion one can draw with certainty is that this dissertation 
presents some promising results that warrant further investigation to see whether they can be 
confirmed. 
Conclusion 
The statistical analyses presented here provide support for many of the hypotheses 
proposed in this dissertation. Federalism is associated with lower food security. Administrative 
and fiscal decentralization are both strongly associated with higher food security in my cross-
sectional factor score model. However, in the time-series cross-sectional models that use direct 
measures of administrative and fiscal decentralization, neither one is a significant predictor of 
food security. Democracy is positively associated with food security, with the strongest and most 
consistent results showing that civil liberties may be relatively more important than political 
rights. 
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CHAPTER 5 POLITICS AND FOOD SECURITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
Introduction 
Food security is partly determined by politics. This dissertation examined three political 
determinants of food security: democracy, decentralization, and federalism. Each one was 
operationalized and tested against food security using different subsets of a dataset of all 
countries from 1990 to 2011. Democracy was divided along two dimensions: political rights and 
civil liberties. Both are significant positive predictors of food security. Increases in civil liberties 
are more consistently and strongly associated with food security than increases in political rights. 
Decentralization was assessed along three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political. Fiscal 
and administrative decentralization are both significantly associated with higher food security, 
although not consistently in all models. The strongest predictor of food security in any model 
(even compared to economic and geographic factors) was fiscal decentralization measured as a 
factor score and deployed in a cross-sectional model. However, direct measures of fiscal and 
administrative decentralization were not significant predictors of food security in time-series, 
cross-sectional models. Finally, federalism is negatively associated with food security when 
significant, but it is only significant in five out of the eleven models presented here. This chapter 
reflects back on the dissertation and discusses how it contributes to the literature about social 
welfare, democracy, decentralization, and federalism. 
Democracy and Social Welfare 
This dissertation contributes to the burgeoning literature on democracy and social 
welfare. In that literature, the most consistent finding has been that democracy increases social 
spending. This spending was assumed to enhance social welfare. Subsequent studies that 
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examined social welfare outcomes called that assumption into question and found that 
democracy’s effect on social welfare outcomes is inconsistent, but on balance, positive. However, 
many studies that found positive effects were undercut by sample bias induced by listwise 
deletion of high-performing autocratic regimes due to missing data (Ross 2006). Once sample 
bias from this source was corrected using multiple imputation, democracy was found to have no 
effect on infant or child mortality. Finally, most of the prior work on democracy and social welfare 
used an operationalization of democracy that focused on political institutions and procedures. 
This focus on procedural democracy is particularly troubling, since it seems to exclude much of 
what is qualitatively democratic about democracy as a political system.  
This dissertation adds a new perspective on the relationship between democracy and 
social welfare in several respects. Firstly, I operationalized social welfare as food security, which 
is a topic that has not been addressed in much detail in the quantitative political science 
literature. Secondly, I used a measure of food security, the Food Security Index, that incorporates 
measures on multiple dimensions of food security, rather than using a simpler proxy variable to 
stand in for this complex topic. Thirdly, I employed quantitative measures of democracy that 
capture two important dimensions of that concept: political rights and civil liberties. Political 
rights comprise free and fair elections, universal suffrage, competitive parties, empowered 
opposition parties, and freedom of participation. Civil liberties comprise freedom of speech, the 
press, religion, freedom from discrimination, freedom to organize and assemble, property rights, 
and rule of law (Freedom House 2014b). Finally, I used multiple imputation to correct for possible 
sample bias due to patterns of missing data. My results remained significant and positive.  
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The analysis presented here provides a nuanced view of the characteristics of democracy 
that produce better social welfare. Political rights and civil liberties both matter for food security, 
but they matter differently. Civil liberties are more strongly and more consistently associated 
with increased food security than political rights. Civil liberties have an effect even when they are 
only partially protected. That effect is enhanced by complete protections, but the largest increase 
in food security associated with any of the democracy variables comes from a partial opening on 
the civil liberties dimension. In addition, civil liberties are continuously effective. Every year that 
civil liberties are protected produces better food security. Partial openings in political rights are 
not effective – it is all or nothing along the political rights dimension. Political rights are also only 
intermittently effective. In fact, political rights were only statistically significant with a four-year 
lag between the political rights measurement and the year when food security was measured 
(although the coefficient magnitudes were consistent across all lags). This suggests that political 
rights may be affecting food security through a somewhat different mechanism than civil 
liberties. 
Future directions. I found that political rights and civil liberties both produce more food security, 
but they do so in different ways. Therefore, there are different directions for future research for 
each dimension. Civil liberties were effective at increasing food security even if the opening was 
only partial. In fact, the movement from no civil liberties to partial protections was the most 
effective. The civil liberties measure employed in this dissertation comes from Freedom House, 
and it includes information about a series of different individual rights and freedoms, and the 
rule of law. It would be useful to investigate if there is a specific subset of civil liberties that is 
particularly effective in increasing food security. For example, Amartya Sen (1991; 1983) argues 
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that freedom of the press is particularly important to ensure a free flow of information about the 
state of social welfare, which can then serve to mobilize people to hold politicians accountable 
and make government more responsive. He argued this in relation to famine, however, which is 
the type of disaster that has the ingredients to hold the attention of the news media. What about 
the case of chronic hunger of the type addressed in this project? Chronic hunger exists in the 
background and is not often the focus of splashy media coverage. Employing different measures 
that separate the concept of civil liberties into its constituent parts may be useful to see what 
exactly is driving the effect that civil liberties have on food security. 
 Political rights are a different matter. Two pieces of information suggest that the 
relationship of political rights to social welfare may be cyclical. Political rights give people the 
ability to elect officials who will pay attention to food security. This power is centered on 
elections, however. While elections themselves hold politicians accountable, and officials may 
feel electoral pressure to address constituents’ needs, this effect may not be consistent and 
continuous, especially if no election is imminent. Scholars who study political commitment to 
hunger reduction have found that country experts in six countries all reported that expenditures 
on hunger were sensitive to electoral cycles (te Lintelo et al. 2014). Viewed in that context, my 
results may fit this cyclical interpretation. That is the subject of my recommendations for future 
research into the effect of political rights on food security.  
 If food security is tied to electoral cycles, that effect ought to be measurable. One 
possibility is to include a measure of whether or not a particular year was an election year in each 
country. That would determine whether any increases in food security are specifically election-
year effects, while also providing a way to assess the magnitude of any effect. A second possibility 
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is to include, for each year, how many years it has been since the last election. Presumably – if 
the electoral cycle theory holds – as elections grow more distant, food security ought to decrease. 
 Finally, the Freedom House measures have been somewhat controversial, given that for 
many years Freedom House was opaque with its methods for determining the scores. This has 
largely been rectified – Freedom House now publishes documentation which describes the 
panels of experts and the questionnaires that are used to score countries. I argue that the 
Freedom House measures capture more information about the democratic nature of each 
country than do measures like Polity IV. However, turning to even more nuanced measures of 
democracy, such as those being developed by the Varieties of Democracy team (Coppedge 1999, 
2002), may be useful for future research.  
Decentralization and Social Welfare 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on decentralization and social welfare by 
providing a cross-national quantitative study of a subject that has often been viewed through the 
lens of case studies. My results for decentralization and food security were mixed. In the cross-
sectional model using factor scores, both fiscal and administrative decentralization were 
positively associated with food security. Fiscal decentralization, when measured as a factor score, 
had a larger coefficient than any other variable in any of the models. In fact, an increase of only 
about 16 percent in fiscal decentralization would be expected to produce the same magnitude 
change in food security as moving from not free to completely free in terms of civil liberties. 
Administrative decentralization, when measured as a factor score, also produces a positive effect 
– substantively large, but smaller than that of fiscal decentralization. An increase of about 24 
percent in administrative decentralization would be expected to produce the same magnitude 
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change in food security as a complete opening in civil liberties. These results were not replicated, 
however, in my time-series cross-sectional models that used direct measures of fiscal and 
administrative decentralization. In those models, none of the measures of decentralization were 
significantly related to food security. In addition, political decentralization, measured as a factor 
score, was not associated with food security. 
Future directions. This dissertation contributes to the quantitative empirical literature on 
decentralization. However, the inconsistency of the results across my two types of models 
indicates that further research is necessary before drawing any conclusions. Methodologically 
speaking, the model with the significant results is the least robust, for two reasons. First, it is 
based on a limited sample of 42 countries which are selected into the sample based on data 
availability. Second, the dataset used for this model is cross-sectional. It is impossible to rule out 
that there may be period-specific effects between 1996 and 2000 (when the independent 
variables and the dependent variable were measured, respectively) that account for the 
significant coefficients. More data collection is the answer here – ideally enough data would 
become available so that more time slices of decentralization factor scores could be calculated 
and used in a time-series, cross-sectional analysis. If the relationships shown in my cross-sectional 
model continued to hold across different time periods, that would bolster the argument that 
fiscal and administrative decentralization are positively associated with food security. 
 Finally, the political decentralization measure used herein may be problematic – it is 
worth noting that these doubts are shared with the original architect of these measures 
(Schneider 2003). The factor score for political decentralization was based on the presence of 
local and subnational elections, without assessing the quality of the elections, local participation, 
114 
 
candidates, or anything else. It would be a useful avenue of future research to gather more data 
on measures that could capture the meaningfulness of local or subnational elections. If the 
concept could be better measured, rather than lumping effectively and ineffectively 
decentralized countries together into the same category, then I could be more certain in my 
conclusions. As it stands, I would argue that the question of whether political decentralization 
affects food security should remain open pending further investigation. 
Federalism and Social Welfare 
Federalism has been the subject of a great deal of debate. Many scholars have argued 
that federalism can constrain spending of all types. Those who focus on redistribution theorize 
that federalism makes redistribution more difficult. Of the eleven models presented in this 
dissertation, five showed federalism to have a significant and substantive negative effect on food 
security. This supports the theoretical contention that federalism makes redistribution (i.e. in this 
case, spending on and implementation of social welfare programs like the ones that address food 
insecurity) less likely.  
Future directions. Future research in this area should focus on two things. First, other measures 
of social welfare could be utilized. This project provides preliminary evidence that federalism 
negatively affects food security. Does it have the same effect on other social welfare problems 
whose solutions have a redistributive basis? In other words, if redistribution is a problem under 
federalism, that ought to show up in cross-national studies of all kinds of social welfare measures. 
Second, with careful selection, measures of social welfare could be used that would maximize 
the available data. About a third of all federations did not appear in my democracy models, for 
example, because the FSI was not measured for all of them. Specifically, the wealthy federations 
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are excluded from my dataset. It would be helpful to choose a dependent variable that captures 
social welfare, at the same time making sure that it was measured for the vast majority of 
federations. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I theorized that political rights and civil liberties – two dimensions of 
democracy – would produce more food security. The results presented herein suggest that this 
is true, and offer a more nuanced view. Food insecurity is almost by definition an affliction of the 
least powerful in any society (Sen 1983). If democracy increases food security, it must do so, in 
the simplest of terms, by putting the right people in office and subsequently pushing them to 
adopt the right policies. The former is a function of an open and competitive system of elections 
in which all candidates compete freely, and all societal groups can exercise their voting rights; 
only in such a system do candidates who represent those with the least power have a chance of 
getting into government. The latter is a function of keeping up political pressure to ensure 
continuous attention to the problem of food insecurity. Political pressure of this type comes from 
mobilized groups – mobilization which is only possible if civil liberties are effectively protected. 
If this type of continuous pressure is absent, then attention to food insecurity is likely to vary 
depending on electoral cycles. In short, political rights ensure responsiveness through electing 
the right people, and civil liberties ensure responsiveness by providing the avenues to maintain 
continuous pressure, to motivate politicians to respond even when no election is imminent. 
 While democracy produces higher food security, the magnitude is small compared with 
that which may be produced by decentralization. Fiscal decentralization produces a 
comparatively large increase in food security. Administrative decentralization produces a slightly 
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lower magnitude of change, while still being substantively large. These results come from a model 
estimated on limited data in a very specific time frame, however, so further investigation is 
warranted before drawing firm conclusions. Federalism seems to provide an impediment to 
increasing food security. 
 For a long time, scholars who study food security have focused on economic and 
environmental explanations for the problem of food insecurity (Leathers and Foster 2004). This 
dissertation shows that without a doubt, politics matter for food security. Absent careful 
attention to the political determinants of food security, recommended solutions may be at best 
incomplete and, at worst, ineffective. Political variables should be taken into account and studied 
in our global effort to solve this important social welfare problem. 
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APPENDIX A DATA DICTIONARY 
Table A.1. Data Dictionary 
Variable  Description Coding Source 
Food Security 
prevUN Prevalence of 
undernourishment (%) 
3-year averages, 
coded into middle 
year 
(IFPRI 2012) 
UN FAO Food 
Security Indicators 
u5uw Children under 5 who are 
underweight (%) 
 (IFPRI 2012) 
UN FAO Food 
Security Indicators 
u5mort Mortality in children under 5  (IFPRI 2012) 
World Bank 
FSI Food Security Index 
= 1 −
1
3
(𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑈𝑁
+ 𝑢5𝑢𝑤 + 𝑢5𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡) 
 
Democracy 
CL_Free Civil Liberties: Free if Freedom House Civil 
Liberties Ranking = 
[6,7], then 1, else 0  
(Freedom House 
2014a) 
CL_PartF Civil Liberties: Part Free if Freedom House Civil 
Liberties Ranking = 
[3,4,5], then 1, else 0  
(Freedom House 
2014a) 
PR_Free Political Rights: Free if Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Ranking = [6,7], then 
1, else 0  
(Freedom House 
2014a) 
PR_PartF Political Rights: Part Free if Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Ranking = [3,4,5], then 
1, else 0  
(Freedom House 
2014a) 
Decentralization 
adminDct Administrative 
Decentralization 
Factor Score from  
0 = centralized to  
1 = decentralized 
(Schneider 2003a) 
fiscalDct Fiscal Decentralization Factor Score from  
0 = centralized to  
1 = decentralized 
(Schneider 2003a) 
polDct Political Decentralization Factor Score from  
0 = centralized to  
1 = decentralized 
(Schneider 2003a) 
federalism Does the country have a 
federal constitution? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
CIA World Factbook 
(Watts 2008) 
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lclExp Local Government 
Expenditures as share of Total 
Government Expenditures (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
lclRev_TG Local Government Revenues 
as a share of Total 
Government Revenues (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
lclTax_Rev Local Government Tax 
Revenue as a share of Total 
Local Government Revenue 
(%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
lclCmpEmp Local Government 
Compensation of Employees 
as a share of Total 
Government Compensation of 
Employees (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
SNExp Subnational Government 
Expenditures as a share of 
Total Government 
Expenditures (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
SNRev_TG Subnational Government 
Revenues as a share of Total 
Government Revenues (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
SNTax_Rev Subnational Government Tax 
Revenue as a share of Total 
Subnational Government 
Revenue (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
SNCmpEmp Subnational Government 
Compensation of Employees 
as a share of Total 
Government Compensation of 
Employees (%) 
 IMF Government 
Finance Statistics 
Descriptive and Control Variables 
ccode Country code Unique identifier  
country Country name  United Nations 
subregion Geographical Subregion 1 = North Africa 
2 = sub-Saharan Africa 
3 = Caucasus and 
       Central Asia 
4 = East Asia 
5 = South Asia 
6 = Southeast Asia 
7 = West Asia (Middle 
       East) 
United Nations 
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8 = Caribbean 
9 = Latin America 
10 = Oceania 
11 = Europe 
12 = North America 
subSaharan Is the country in sub-Saharan 
Africa? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
United Nations 
GDPperCap Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita 
natural log World Bank 
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APPENDIX B COUNTRIES INCLUDED BY MODEL 
Table B.1. Countries Included in Democracy and Food Security Model 
* indicates a federal country 
Region Country 
Northern Africa  
 Algeria 
 Egypt 
 Libya 
 Morocco 
 Tunisia 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 Angola 
 Benin 
 Botswana 
 Burkina Faso 
 Burundi 
 Cameroon 
 Central African Republic 
 Chad 
 Comoros 
 Congo 
 Côte d'Ivoire 
 Djibouti 
 Eritrea 
 Ethiopia* 
 Gabon 
 Gambia 
 Ghana 
 Guinea 
 Guinea-Bissau 
 Kenya 
 Lesotho 
 Liberia 
 Madagascar 
 Malawi 
 Mali 
 Mauritania 
 Mauritius 
 Mozambique 
 Namibia 
 Niger 
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 Nigeria* 
 Rwanda 
 Senegal 
 Sierra Leone 
 South Africa 
 Sudan* (former) 
 Swaziland 
 Togo 
 Uganda 
 United Republic of Tanzania 
 Zambia 
 Zimbabwe 
Caucasus and Central Asia  
 Armenia 
 Azerbaijan 
 Georgia 
 Kazakhstan 
 Kyrgyzstan 
 Tajikistan 
 Turkmenistan 
 Uzbekistan 
East Asia  
 China 
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 Mongolia 
South Asia  
 Bangladesh 
 India* 
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
 Nepal* 
 Pakistan* 
 Sri Lanka 
Southeast Asia  
 Cambodia 
 Indonesia 
 Lao People's Democratic Republic 
 Malaysia* 
 Philippines 
 Thailand 
 Timor Leste 
 Viet Nam 
West Asia (Middle East)  
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 Jordan 
 Kuwait 
 Lebanon 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Syrian Arab Republic 
 Turkey 
 Yemen 
Caribbean  
 Cuba 
 Dominican Republic 
 Haiti 
 Jamaica 
 Trinidad and Tobago 
Latin America  
 Argentina* 
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
 Brazil* 
 Chile 
 Colombia 
 Costa Rica 
 Ecuador 
 El Salvador 
 Guatemala 
 Guyana 
 Honduras 
 Mexico* 
 Nicaragua 
 Panama 
 Paraguay 
 Peru 
 Suriname 
 Uruguay 
 Venezuela* (Bolivarian Republic of) 
Oceania  
 Fiji 
Europe  
 Albania 
 Belarus 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina* 
 Bulgaria 
 Croatia 
 Estonia 
123 
 
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
 Republic of Moldova 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation* 
 Slovakia 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Ukraine 
 
Table B.2. Countries Included in the Decentralization Factor Scores Model 
* indicates a federal country 
Region Country 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 Botswana 
 Kenya 
 Mauritius 
 Senegal 
 South Africa 
 Zimbabwe 
Caucasus and Central Asia  
 Azerbaijan 
 Georgia 
 Kazakhstan 
 Kyrgyzstan 
 Tajikistan 
East Asia  
 China 
 Mongolia 
South Asia  
 India* 
Southeast Asia  
 Indonesia 
 Malaysia* 
 Philippines 
 Thailand 
Caribbean  
 Dominican Republic 
 Trinidad and Tobago 
Latin America  
 Argentina* 
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
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 Brazil* 
 Chile 
 Guatemala 
 Mexico* 
 Nicaragua 
 Panama 
 Paraguay 
 Peru 
Oceania  
 Fiji 
Europe  
 Albania 
 Belarus 
 Bulgaria 
 Croatia 
 Estonia 
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
 Republic of Moldova 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation* 
 Slovakia 
 
Table B.3. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 1 
* indicates a federal country 
Region Country 
North Africa  
 Morocco 
 Tunisia 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 Congo 
 Lesotho 
 Mauritius 
 South Africa 
Caucasus and Central Asia  
 Armenia 
 Azerbaijan 
 Georgia 
 Kazakhstan 
East Asia  
 China 
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 Mongolia 
South Asia  
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Southeast Asia  
 Indonesia 
 Malaysia* 
 Thailand 
West Asia (Middle East)  
 Jordan 
 Turkey 
Caribbean  
 Jamaica 
Latin America  
 Argentina* 
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
 Brazil* 
 Chile 
 Colombia 
 Costa Rica 
 El Salvador 
 Honduras 
Europe  
 Belarus 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina* 
 Bulgaria 
 Estonia 
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
 Republic of Moldova 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation* 
 Serbia 
 Slovakia 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Ukraine 
 
Table B.4. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 2 
* indicates a federal country 
Region Country 
North Africa  
 Morocco 
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 Tunisia 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 Congo 
 Lesotho 
 Mauritius 
 South Africa 
Caucasus and Central Asia  
 Armenia 
 Azerbaijan 
 Georgia 
 Kazakhstan 
East Asia  
 China 
 Mongolia 
South Asia  
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Southeast Asia  
 Indonesia 
 Malaysia* 
 Thailand 
West Asia (Middle East)  
 Jordan 
 Turkey 
Caribbean  
 Jamaica 
Latin America  
 Argentina* 
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
 Brazil* 
 Chile 
 Colombia 
 Costa Rica 
 El Salvador 
 Honduras 
 Mexico* 
Europe  
 Belarus 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina* 
 Bulgaria 
 Croatia 
 Estonia 
 Latvia 
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 Lithuania 
 Republic of Moldova 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation* 
 Serbia 
 Slovakia 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Ukraine 
 
Table B.5. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 3 
* indicates a federal country 
Region Country 
North Africa  
 Morocco 
 Tunisia 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 Congo 
 Lesotho 
 Mauritius 
 South Africa 
Caucasus and Central Asia  
 Armenia 
 Azerbaijan 
 Georgia 
 Kazakhstan 
East Asia  
 Mongolia 
South Asia  
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Southeast Asia  
 Indonesia 
 Thailand 
West Asia (Middle East)  
 Jordan 
 Turkey 
Caribbean  
 Jamaica 
Latin America  
 Argentina* 
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
 Brazil* 
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 Chile 
 Colombia 
 Costa Rica 
 El Salvador 
 Honduras 
Europe  
 Belarus 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina* 
 Bulgaria 
 Croatia 
 Estonia 
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
 Republic of Moldova 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation* 
 Serbia 
 Slovakia 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Ukraine 
 
Table B.6. Countries Included in the IMF Subnational Decentralization Model 4 
* indicates a federal country 
Region Country 
North Africa  
 Morocco 
 Tunisia 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 Botswana 
 Congo 
 Ethiopia* 
 Kenya 
 Lesotho 
 Mauritius 
 Senegal 
 South Africa 
 Uganda 
 Zambia 
 Zimbabwe 
Caucasus and Central Asia  
 Armenia 
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 Azerbaijan 
 Georgia 
 Kazakhstan 
 Kyrgyzstan 
East Asia  
 China 
 Mongolia 
South Asia  
 India* 
 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
 Sri Lanka 
Southeast Asia  
 Indonesia 
 Malaysia* 
 Philippines 
 Thailand 
West Asia (Middle East)  
 Jordan 
 Turkey 
Caribbean  
 Jamaica 
 Trinidad and Tobago 
Latin America  
 Argentina* 
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
 Brazil* 
 Chile 
 Colombia 
 Costa Rica 
 El Salvador 
 Guatemala 
 Honduras 
 Mexico* 
 Nicaragua 
 Paraguay 
 Peru 
Europe  
 Albania 
 Belarus 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina* 
 Bulgaria 
 Croatia 
130 
 
 Estonia 
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
 Republic of Moldova 
 Romania 
 Russian Federation* 
 Serbia 
 Slovakia 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Ukraine 
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THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FOOD SECURITY:  
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Food security is partially determined by politics. This dissertation examines three political 
determinants of food security: democracy, decentralization, and federalism. Each one is 
operationalized and tested quantitatively against food security using a dataset of all countries 
from 1990 to 2011, although each model employs a different subset of the dataset. Democracy 
is divided along two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. Both are significant positive 
predictors of food security. Increases in civil liberties are more consistently and strongly 
associated with food security than increases in political rights.  
Decentralization is assessed along three dimensions: fiscal, administrative, and political. 
Fiscal and administrative decentralization, when measured as factor scores, were significantly 
associated with higher food security. In fact, the strongest predictor of food security in any model 
(even compared to economic and geographic factors) was fiscal decentralization, when 
measured as a factor score. However, direct measures of fiscal and administrative 
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decentralization were not significantly associated with food security. Finally, federalism has a 
consistently strong and negative effect when significant, but it is not significant in all models. 
This dissertation contributes to the burgeoning literature on democracy and social 
welfare, particularly because multiple imputation was used to correct for sample bias and the 
effects remained significant and positive. In addition, it provides a nuanced view of the 
characteristics of democracy that produce better social welfare. It contributes to the literature 
on decentralization and social welfare, a subject often viewed through the lens of qualitative case 
studies, by providing a cross-national quantitative study of the subject. Finally, it contributes to 
the literature on federalism by testing theories about the difficulties of redistribution under 
federalism. Avenues of future research are suggested. 
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